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This Master’s thesis studies the EU narratives in Estonian populist radical right (PRR) 
party’s alternative media channel Uued Uudised, which serves as an ideological platform 
where Estonian Conservative People’s party (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, 
EKRE) distributes news from their perspective. PRR movement is on the rise all over EU, 
but also in Western World in general. Their core ideology is combined with xenophobic 
nationalism – opposition to immigration, multiculturalism, political elite, while 
supporting authoritarianism claiming to represent the ‘pure’ ordinary citizens. 
Euroscepticism entered the agenda of Estonian discourse with the accession of EU in 
early 2000’s, however, became a prominent actor during the refugee crisis, that occurred 
shortly after EKRE’s electoral breakthrough in 2015 and has allowed EKRE to expand 
its discursive opportunities. However, Estonia was not hit by a wave of asylum seekers. 
EKRE’s successfully mobilized their electorate through socio-psychological strategies 
and playing on people’s feeling of security, comparing EU as the new oppressor after the 
collapse of Soviet Union. Strategical approaches, as relying on conspiracy theories, 
victim-attacker roles, attribution of blame and ability the push their favorable agenda to 
political discourse or public, highlight the PRR rhetoric as important tool implementing 
their nationalist imaginaries of less integrated EU and more sovereign Estonia. Based on 
this research is proposed a theory, that EKRE extensively uses specific EU narratives for 
scapegoating the EU through real and imagined fears and deepening the polarization of 
society in order to maintain their electorate. PRR rhetoric serves as a useful ‘toolbox’ of 
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The liberal world order that has dominated in Western World over 20 years, is now more 
than ever being challenged by Eurosceptic political forces that the migration crisis of 
2015 set in motion. The movement of populistic nationalism in the Western World and 
the European Union need to be seen and studied as pathological normalcy (Mudde, 2016a: 
3). Guiso et al., (2018) state that protectionism against immigrants, globalization and free 
trade is featured in the policy positions of the Trump administration in US, post-Brexit 
UK, in Southern Europe, the Italian Five Stars movement and the Greek and Spanish 
populist movements call for a guaranteed minimum income and other forms of short-term 
economic protection, while in continental Europe, populist radical right (henceforth PRR) 
movements stress protection from immigrants, often linking them with Islamic terrorism. 
In 19 EU member states out of the 27 PPR parties have gained a share of votes in last 
legislative election and in 8 countries PRR grabbed over 15 per cent of votes. 
There are many arguments as to why PRR parties come to power, however a larger 
consensus exists that one of the most relevant facilitating factors for the emergence of the 
radical right is the political space made available by mainstream parties (Koopmans and 
Muis, 2009; Mudde, 2016a; Mudde, 2016b; Betz, 2018; Minkeberg, 2017; Bornschier, 
2016; Kriesi et al., 2006), since mainstream EU parties have withhold politicization of 
EU in the fear of causing irreversible reputational damage (Vasilopoulou, 2018: 1-2). 
Moving from the European Economic Community of the 1980s to signing of the 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992, turned EU’s course into more integrated union, which is when 
Euroscepticism started to rise (Mudde, 2016b), since with the social European Union, the 
‘permissive consensus’ was no longer a given (Mudde, 2016b: 77) and the people unable 
to go along with the globalization were left behind (Bornschier, 2018). Mudde (2016b: 
78) claims that more than ever before there is a need for an open debate on European 
integration, but this time a debate that explores all options, including the return to a less 
integrated EU. The complexity of this lies in the specific rhetorical approach of PRR, 
since consensus nor compromise are usually acceptable outcomes for PRR (Greven, 
2016).  
Populist radical right parties are characterized by three main features: nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism, the key feature being nativism – an ideology which holds 
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that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the nation and that non-native 
element, such as persons and ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the nation-state’s 
homogeneity (Mudde, 2016a; Mudde, 2016b; Rydgren, 2017). Populist claim that the 
society consists of two homogeneous groups, the common folk and the elite, they claim 
to represent the ordinary citizens (Mudde, 2007; Mudde, 2016a; Betz, 2018; Minkenberg, 
2017). 
Estonian Conservative People’s Party (Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond, henceforth 
EKRE) qualifies as PRR party (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019; Kasekamp, Madisson and 
Wierenga, 2018; Petsinis, 2019; Wierenga, 2017; Wierenga, 2019), since PRR party’s 
core ideology is combined with xenophobic nationalism – opposition to immigration, 
multiculturalism, political elite, while supporting authoritarianism claiming to represent 
the ‘pure’ ordinary citizens (Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018; Wierenga, 2017). 
It emerged in 2013 and is led by a father and son duo – Mart and Martin Helme.  
Eastern Europe countries carry with them a legacy of communism, which challenges the 
new liberal-democratic order, including the EU, and has in different ways effected the 
political culture, party competition and a general idea of politics and nation-building, 
where the legacy of former authoritarian regimes is often exploited by PRR parties 
(Minkenberg, 2017; Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018; Norocel and Szabo, 
2019).  
EKRE gained popularity by opposing the EU’s immigration policy, Euroscepticism, 
driven by xenophobic nationalism ensured EKRE’s popularity during and after the 
immigration crisis (Petsinis, 2019: 225; Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018; 
Braghiroli and Petsinis: 2019; Makarychev and Sazono, 2019; Wierenga, 2017; 
Wierenga, 2019). ‘Euroscepticism’ entered the agenda of Estonian discourse with the 
accession of EU in early 2000’s, however, became a prominent actor during the refugee 
crisis, that occurred shortly after EKRE’s electoral breakthrough in 2015 and has allowed 
EKRE to expand its discoursive opportunities ever sense (Kasekamp, Madisson, 
Wierenga, 2018). Estonia’s case, as well as Latvia’s or Poland’s, is characterized by 
successful mobilization of PRR electorate based solely on the threat of immigrants, since 
asylum seekers arrived in marginal numbers compared to other Southern states. 
Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019) call this a socio-psychological strategy interlinking 
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immigration to the collective memories of ‘colonization’ under the Soviet Union and the 
collective anxieties of becoming oppressed again.  
Visibility in the public discourse, including both positive and negative media reporting, 
is crucial for PRR parties in order to gain popularity and increase support among voters 
(Norocel and Szabo, 2019; Norocel, Szabo and Bene, 2017; Koopmans and Muis, 2009; 
Koopmans and Olzak, 2013; Ellinas, 2009; Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga; 2018). 
By bringing in new topics and making it the key agenda in public discourse, PRR have 
been able to ‘light the fuse’ (Pytlas and Kossack, 2015) steering the discourse in a 
direction that is favourable to them. Journalists Afanasyev and Salumaa (2019) write: 
‘The outcry is in style and the ears are locked. The war-cry of national debate, the pig-
cry of liberal debate and children’s-cry on climate debate. /.../ Is pep-talk in a form of a 
meeting a demonstration or a debate? We think it is not. We think that things can be 
discussed emotionally, while maintaining rationality and listening to each other. Perhaps 
the debate is possible without excessive attacking, humiliation and gloating?’. In an 
increasingly polarizing world, keeping in mind the Brexit in the UK and Trump's rule in 
the United States, the opposition between left and right has reached Estonian mainstream 
(Gershkovich, 2019), further distancing the two major groups. 
Uued Uudised is one of the most important centers of Estonian PRRs, as articles there are 
distributed and posted in large volumes on Facebook and blogs (Kasekamp, Madisson 
and Wierenga, 2018). It is also one of the purest sources for understanding EKRE’s 
Eurosceptic discourse since the information there is provided from EKRE for EKRE’s 
supporters. It was created in 2015 – at a time when the immigration crisis was at its peak 
and EKRE support in Estonia started to increase very rapidly. On average, the portal is 
visited about 40,000 times a month in 2019.  
It qualifies as an alternative media channel since it claims to promote freedom of speech, 
however, serves an ideological purpose of distributing EKRE’s political agenda and does 
not follow the three core principles that makes the news credible, that are: the author has 
to be objective and not include his or her own opinions, but rely on facts and statements 
of the interviewees, assessments are given by the interviewees; the news has to be 
balanced, which means interviewing both or more people to include different sides of the 
story and wording their statements as closely as possible in the article; the news has to be 
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punctual – facts need to be checked (Hennoste, 2008). Moreover, PRR ‘toolbox’ of 
rhetoric is widely used in Uued Uudised. The rhetorical tools in PRR discourse that help 
them achieve their goals, that consists of discursive strategies for implementing victim-
attacker roles, stigmatization, confrontation, and construction of conspiracy theories 
(Wodak, 2015). Common is attribution of blame, verbal attacking, sexist, racist discourse, 
that is justified by ‘standing for identity’.  
According to Madisson and Ventsel (2017) we live in an era where collaborative media 
can be regarded as the era of post-truth, where vernacular authority prevails, or truth is 
no longer a clear fact, but rather the truthfulness lies behind who makes the claim. 
Credible is the mouth of the people, not institutional authority such as the press, church 
or corporation – mainstream and elite are considered fundamentally wrong. However, this 
also leads to spreading of factually incorrect information. For example, Minister of Rural 
Affairs Mart Järvik (2019) said that Estonia has not benefited from EU funding, although 
in 2017 the EU contributed about 648 million euros to Estonia and Estonia only 154 
million euros to the EU (European Union website, 2019). In 2018 Estonia paid 210.2 
million euros to the European Union budget and received 759.4 million euros (Leas, 
2019). Estonia receives 3-4 times more money from the European Union than it 
contributes. Euroscepticism is therefore in the so-called toolbox of the Estonian PRRs as 
a double-edged sword, that they try to present as one-edged.  
The importance of EKRE’s Eurosceptic narratives lie in the importance of EU’s support, 
unlike other countries where the PRRs have come to power, such as the United States1, 
Estonia is largely dependent on the support of the European Union and NATO. Narrative 
in political discourse means ‘construction of disparate facts in our own worlds that are 
weaved together cognitively in order to make sense of reality’ with its gravity lying in the 
effect they have in the construction of political behaviour, since people create and use 
narratives to interpret and understand the political realities around them as individuals but 
also in collective units, as nations or groups (Patterson and Monroe, 1998: 315-316). 
 
1 The ‘us versus them’ approach has been used by the Republican Party politicians for decades. Richard 
Nixon, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. all played on racist sentiments of white voters and George W. 
Bush won 2004 election playing on heterophobia. However, this political opportunism did not turn the party 
into a populist one, the nomination of Donald Trump did (Greven, 2016). 
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European issues are raised by the PRRs in a sense that is useful to them at a particular 
moment, using a variety of rhetorical techniques. Political rhetoric can be seen as a mix 
of political argument, debate, communication or discourse and rhetorical strategies as 
serving a number of communicative functions simultaneously (Billig, Condor and 
Tieleaga, 2013).  
In Hungary, liberal democracy has been replaced with radical right by the Fidesz 
government since 2010, so Viktor Orbán has even declared the country to be an illiberal 
democracy (Kondor, 2018). Also, Poland’s national-conservative governmental party 
Law and Justice (PiS) inherited the radical right approach and the electorate from League 
of Polish Families (LPR) and is restricting the independence of the judiciary and public 
broadcasting in order to prepare further far-reaching reforms. (Minkenberg, 2017). 
Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán initiated and led a coalition of governments in 
the region in early 2016 which tried to establish a countermovement within the EU. In 
France, Marine Le Pen leads the National Rally party which for decades has had a right-
wing extremist course, although Le Pen has worked towards a ‘de-demonization’ of the 
party in order to broaden its base by shifting from antisemitism to an anti-immigrant, 
Islamophobic position and a shift from economic liberalism to a policy of protection of 
the French people against globalization. Anti-EU nationalism and anti-elitism are 
mainstays of the National Rally program. (Minkenberg, 2017; Greven, 2016).  
According to Vasilopoulou (2011), the European Union's opposition in the PRR 
narratives can be divided into three: complete adversary, conditional and willing to 
compromise. Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) place EKRE in a conditional 
category because, while being Eurosceptic, the European Union is not as big an enemy 
as is Russia. 
Being the third most popular party in Estonia, with 18% support (Erakondade Reitingud 
Webpage, 2020) and member of the government, EKRE has a clear influence on the 
thinking and behaviour of members of society, which should not be underestimated. 
According to a study by Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) EKRE gained 
popularity in Estonia through four main subjects – anti-Russian attitudes, family values, 
refugees and Euroscepticism, that according to the authors, each subject still requires in-
depth research. The goal of my research is to add a small amount of knowledge into 
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studying the PRR and more specifically into studying Estonian PRR EKRE, who because 
of being a relatively new party, has not been thoroughly studied (Kasekamp, Madisson, 
Wierenga, 2018; Wierenga, 2017). The aim of my thesis is to add some insight by 
exploring one of the main themes that ensured their popularity – Euroscepticism, driven 
by xenophobic nationalism. 
The results of my research could be useful for the further academic research of PRR in 
Post-Communist countries, especially how they construct the European Union (EU). 
EKRE portrays clearly that there are two kinds of people – conservatives and EU-minded 
people. It is not possible to know, if EKRE leaders themselves believe in what they say, 
but more important is, what effect they have on their supporters and what effect EU 
narratives might have to their supporters understanding of EU and EU related topics, 
which means also on Western society. I argue that that emotions, like, fear, resentfulness 
and anger, play a significant role in the discourse of EKRE which is why EKRE uses a 
number of tools within the PRR’s ‘toolbox,’ (Wodak, 2015) such as discursive strategies 
for implementing victim-attacker roles, stigmatization, confrontation, and construction of 
conspiracy theories. 
According to Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) mass media and social media 
both have served as convenient tools for PRR parties to showcase their agendas and 
engage the public. Moreover, they name the role played by media and public discourse 
as key aspect of the mainstreaming of the PRR. Wierenga (2019) says that the 
communication and rhetoric of PRR party family has changed due to the possibility of 
social media. Nowadays the social media plays a crucial role as medium for spreading 
political opinions and information directly to people without the intermediation of 
broadcast media.  
Many articles have been written about ‘politics of fear’ towards ‘the others’ in recent 
decades in the European context creating stereotypical images of mostly Muslim 
immigrants – as homogeneous, fundamentalist, Anti-Western or pre-modern, 
authoritarian, violent – and exaggerated claims of an apocalyptic future, in which 
minarets have replaced church towers and Islamic majorities oppress ‘native’ minorities 
(Mudde, 2016b). I argue that PRR manipulative rhetoric – blaming, fear attribution and 
pressing on feeling of security – play a key role in EKRE’s EU narratives. Prins and 
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Saharo (2010) claim that in Western Europe is gaining popularity a genre ‘new realism’ 
which is based on addressing and talking about thing as they really are, not as being 
constructed by the elite, this includes breaking taboos, speaking out frankly about societal 
ills, standing up for ordinary people and affirming the positive sides of the Western value 
system and of national identity. However, this should not be mistaken for EKRE’s style 
and rhetoric that seems straightforward and harsh. EKRE uses information in a way that 
is most useful or best for them while using PRR rhetoric, so it is not objective observation 
as described by new realism. Rather, it might seem like it due to the way the information 
is presented – clear cut statements attributed to authoritarian figures, for example Mart 
Helme.  
To understand the role of Euroscepticism, driven by xenophobic nationalism, that ensured 
EKRE’s popularity, two research questions were developed:  
Research question 1: How the European Union is constructed in the 
alternative media channel of Estonian PRR Uued Uudised? 
 
Research question 2: How xenophobic nationalism is used in EU narratives in 
the alternative media channel of Estonian PRR Uued Uudised?  
In my research I take a constructivist (interpretivist) approach. When positivist theory 
seeks causes, favors deterministic explanations and emphasizes generality and 
universality, then constructivist theory emphasizes understanding rather than explanation 
(Charmaz, 20016). My work focuses on interpreting Eurosceptic narratives in EKRE 
alternative media channel Uued Uudised, from where my sample consisted of 209 news 
posts. Coding means identifying and collecting claims, statements and assumptions made 
about EU and EU related topics and analysing them in depth with the coding scheme that 
was developed and named ‘Narrative tree’ (Appendix 1; Figure 3.2.), which gathers three 
levels of narratives – root, branch and leaf – that all emerge from each other. The coded 
posts date from April of 2015 to August 2019. Grounded theory was used as a qualitative 
research method that aims to generate well-grounded theory or hypotheses based on 
empirical data, this way scientific research is treated as a process of getting to know, in 
which knowledge evolves and expands with each new step. The results of my analysis 
show that EU is constructed in Uued Uudised through five main narratives: Being against 
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EU and EU-minded will save EU and nation states; EU wants to have (ultimate) power 
over its member (nation) states; Being and supporting EU-minded is dangerous; EU as 



















1. The Growing Importance of PRR Parties In EU 
We live on a time of fourth wave of PRR2, where populism has reached the mainstream 
and is studied in addition to supply side (Mudde, 2016a; Mudde, 2016b; Minkenberg, 
2017). Guiso et al (2018) and Minkenberg (2017) argue, that populist parties are more 
likely to emerge when countries are faced with a systemic crisis of economic security and 
the orientation choice of populist parties, i.e., whether they arise on left or right of the 
political spectrum, is determined by the availability of political space. Minkenberg (2017: 
18) describes the collapse of the old long-lasting political and ideological regimes with a 
threefold outcome favoring the right-wing: a simple return to old and familiar socialist 
nationalist ideas that the ‘losers’ of modernization as right-wing groups (also Bronchier, 
2018 and Kriesi et al., 2006) prefer; the complexity of the transformation process 
produces large ‘transformation costs’, which can benefit the radical right, since the 
democratization has impacted economic and social aspects of life a lot more than after 
the II World War in Italy and Germany; the change of the social system has been 
accompanied with social disorientation and the socio-cultural conflict resulted in a divide 
or cleavage that issued political competition (also Koopmans and Muis, 2009). 
While populist ideology has much deeper roots in the US than in (Western) Europe, key 
elements are clearly linked to fundamental values of Western societies in general – 
populists argue that the common sense of the people should always take precedence and 
cannot be curtailed by ‘undemocratic’ institutional constraints such as constitutional 
protection of minorities, claiming elitism and pluralism as enemies (Mudde, 2016b). 
Minkenberg (2017: 18) states that simple solutions offering political entrepreneurs appeal 
to ‘the people’ or the nation rather than a universal vision of progress. 
There has been much research on many of the populist radical right (PRR) parties 
throughout Europe, yet this party family is vastly understudied in the Baltic region, 
 
2 The first wave lasted roughly from 1945 till 1980, was mostly historical and descriptive, and focused on 
the historical continuity between the pre-war and post-war periods, the second wave of studies (roughly 
1980-2000) saw an infusion of social science literature, in particular various forms of modernization 
theories, where scholars studied almost exclusively the demand, not the supply side and the third wave took 
off at the turn of the century, as scholars started to focus increasingly on the supply-side of populist radical 
right politics (Mudde, 2016a; Mudde, 2016b). 
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especially Estonia’s case3, even more so when it comes to scholarship on political 
leadership (Wierenga, 2019). Betz (2018: 139-140) states that despite growing academic 
attention to populism in recent years, there is little agreement as to its nature and in media, 
populism has increasingly been conflated with demagoguery, political manipulation, the 
provision of simple solutions to complex problems and the promotion of a black-and-
white view of politics and the world in general and populisms association with the radical 
right has further muddied the waters. In this research populism is approached as an 
understanding or belief that society consists of two opposing homogeneous groups the 
pure common people and the corrupt elites. To embed this PRR parties use different 
rhetorical tools, which will be introduced in the subchapter 1.4 Discursive Rhetorical 
‘Toolbox’ of PRR.  
In this chapter and subchapters The rise of populist radical right as a movement is 
described in the Western world, but even more detailed description is given about Central 
and Eastern Europe, including Estonia’s case, taking account the specialities of post-
communist countries need for sovereignty due to unfinished nation-building and long 
history of oppressors. Introduced are the PRR rhetorical tools common in their discursive 
strategies and the discursive opportunities that they have due to their unprecedented 
rhetorical style in public sphere. At the end of the chapter an overview of Estonian 
Conservative Party’s reaching to power and their alternative media channel Uued 
Uudised is given an overview.  
 
1.1 The Rise of Populist Radical Right  
On both sides of the Atlantic, the Western world is facing an unprecedented wave of 
populist politics and populist rhetoric – protests towards inequality and capitalist 
institutions, leading to left-leaning policy demands matched by similarly oriented populist 
supply (Guiso et al., 2018). According to Betz (2018: 150-152) initially, the focus of 
 
3 Daniel Robert Jarosak’ s (2019) MA Thesis ‘Euroscepticism and EKRE: How Nativism Influences the 
Euroscepticism of Estonia’s Largest Populist Radical Right Party’ concluded that while Eurosceptic party 
EKRE consistently opposes the construction of the EU and believes that the organization is fundamentally 




radical right-wing populist mobilization was mainly economic, however after the migrant 
flow into the job market was clamped down, the left concentrated on defending the rights 
of and integrating the immigrants and in response to that, the PRR focus shifted away 
from migration toward the question of integration of those migrant populations already 
in the country, which in turn resulted in huge and complicated and emotionally charged 
issue, opening a great possibility for populist mobilization. Guiso et al., (2018) state that 
protectionism against immigrants, globalization and free trade is featured in the policy 
positions of the Trump administration in US, post-Brexit UK, in Southern Europe, the 
Italian Five Stars movement and the Greek and Spanish populist movements call for a 
guaranteed minimum income and other forms of short-term economic protection, while 
in continental Europe, PRR movements stress protection from immigrants, often linking 
them with Islamic terrorism.  
Populist radical right parties are characterized by three main features: nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism, the key feature being nativism – an ideology which holds 
that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the nation and that non-native 
element, such as persons and ideas, are fundamentally threatening to the nation-state’s 
homogeneity (Mudde, 2016a; Mudde, 2016b; Rydgren, 2017). (Mudde, 2004: 165-166) 
states that populism is a thin-centred ideology that unlike other ‘full’ ideologies, such as 
liberalism, socialism or conservatism, focuses on the polarization between the people and 
the elite. PRR claim society is divided into two antagonistic sides – the vast majority 
being ordinary, honest, good people and a relatively small group of people who control 
much of society’s economic, political, social and cultural resources (Betz, 2018: 144). 
The ideas under its command are of limited scope and complexity, but applicable to both 
the left and the right, the main difference between them is whom they exclude, which is 
largely determined by their accompanying ideology – nationalism or socialism (Mudde, 
2016b: 59). The radical right distinguishes from extremist right due to the latter being 
opposed to democracy whereas the former opposes only liberal democracy (Mudde, 
2018). Authoritarianism, a core staple of conservatism, is the love towards a strictly 




Common for PRR parties is the gradual role of the charismatic, father-figure like, 
authoritarian leader, with the exception of France’ s right-wing French political party 
National Rally lead by Marine Le Pen, the daughter of the former male leader Jean-Marie 
Le Pen. Viktor Orban secured his third term being the Prime Minister and is also the 
leader of the Alliance Fidesz–KDNP, which received 49 per cent of votes in 2018. Matteo 
Salvini the leader of Italian PRR party, the League is often seen as one of the main 
nationalist actors in European PRR politics. According to McDonnell (2015: 719-720) 
the charismatic role of populist leaders lies in how the leader is seen as they present 
themselves as saviours and are able to rouse the crowds in public, the key aspect being 
‘making the politics personal and immediate instead of being remote and bureaucratic’, 
without the one specific charismatic leader, the party can be seen as ‘faceless’. 
Communication skills, media savviness and appealing as ordinary and down to earth as 
the common people in the streets but at the same time having unique charismatic force in 
them that can be perceived as a political intelligent by the supporters, making relationship 
between the populist leaders and their follower asymmetric (McDonnell, 2015). The ‘firm 
hand of the father figure’ is demonstrated in leadership. The members and supporters of 
Forza Italia, the party of Silvio Berlusconi, said that anyone who did not agree with or 
like Berlusconi’s leadership was immediately out – if you like, you stay (McDonnell, 
2015: 726). EKRE is also lead by father and son duo – Mart and Martin Helme. Similarly 
to Berlusconi, EKRE dismissed Kaimar Karu, Minister of Foreign Trade and Information 
Technology, that had just few months back replaced the the former minister Kert Kingo, 
saying4 ‘We expect all our party ministers to act in accordance with the values and views 
of party supporters, including on issues such as immigration, migrant labor, e-elections 
and the provision of postal services in rural areas.’ Overall, populistic nationalism and 
opposition to immigration are on the rise (Table 1.1.) (Guiso et al., 2018, Greven, 2016; 
Mudde 2016a; Mudde, 2016b; Norocel and Szabo, 2019) and needs to be seen and studied 
as a normalcy (Mudde, 2016a: 3).  
 




Table 1.1. In 19 EU member states PPR parties have gain a share of votes on last 
legislative election and in 8 countries PRR grabbed over 15 per cent of votes5: 
EU Member State PRR party Share of votes Year of election 
Hungary Fidesz–KDNP 
Jobbik 
49 %  
19 % 
2018 
Austria Freedom Party 26 % 2017 
Switzerland Swiss People’s Party 25,6 % 2019 
Estonia Conservative People’s 
party 
17,8 % 2019 
Finland The Finns 17,7 % 2019 
Sweden Sweden Democrats 17,6 % 2018 
Italy The League 17,4 % 2018 
Belgium  New Flemish Alliance 16,3 % 2019 
 
There are many arguments as to why the PRR comes to power, however a larger 
consensus exists that one of the most relevant facilitating factors for the emergence of the 
radical right is the political space made available by mainstream parties (Koopmans and 
Muis, 2009; Mudde, 2016a; Mudde, 2016b; Betz, 2018; Minkeberg, 2017; Bornschier 
(2016); Kriesi et al. (2006); and others). Radical right-wing parties in Europe and 
elsewhere owe their electoral success to a significant extent to strategic and programmatic 
decisions that constitute a decisive break with the past (Betz, 2018: 139), which runs aside 
of the shift in voter behaviour – the political significance of social class has been declining 
and the relevance of issue voting increasing (Vasilopoulou, 2018: 1-2). Koopmans and 
Muis (2009: 646) claim that immigration and cultural diversity resulted in a new cleavage 
on the demand side of political arena. For example, the unexpected and rapid popularity 
of Pim Fortuyn6. According to Betz (2018) and Mudde (2016b) the side of politics must 
also be considered, they argue that the lower classes abandoned the traditional left, due 
to ignoring their concerns and worries, populism being the illiberal democratic response 
 
5Europe and right-wing nationalism: A country-by-country guide. (2019). BBC News, 13. November. 
Visited 5.05.2020 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006  
6 Koopmans and Muis (2009) discovered that before PRR leader Pim Fortuyn rose to power in 2002 in 
Netherlands, there was already for a long time an electoral potential for an anti-immigration party. 
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to undemocratic liberalism. Although the populist radical right trinity of issues – 
corruption-immigration-security – are shared to a great extent, these primarily on socio-
economic issues have not dominated the political debate in western democracies (Mudde, 
2016b: 10). 
Bornschier (2016: 326) and Kriesi et al. (2006: 926) claim that both the rise of the New 
Left and the New Right are the result of globalization, former shaped by education, latter 
by inability to manage new issues that globalization brought along, naming them 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of modernization. The New Left cultural and political agenda 
centres safeguarding and equality, advancing women’s, gay, minorities rights which also 
correlate strongly with educational achievement, whereas The New Right being those 
who disapprove of universalistic principles, defend authoritarian and traditional values 
and monocultural conceptions of community (Bornschier 2018: 318). Kriesi et al. (2006: 
921) researched the supply side of electoral politics Western European countries – 
Austria, Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland – and concluded that 
the former dimensions had been transformed into two dimensional national political 
spaces, different from the traditional class and religious cleavages. Kriesi et al. (2006: 
926) claimed that two intimately related dynamics will rise from this structural 
opposition: the basic structure of the national political space will transform and the 
political parties will strategically reposition. 
According to Greven (2016: 1) many parties sometimes use appeals to the people or claim 
to represent general interests versus the interests of a specific group, the occasional use 
of these strategies does not make a party populist, but rather the consistency of these 
tactics. Rydgren (2017) argues that calling right-wing parties in Europe populist, is 
misleading, since populism is not the most pertinent feature of this party family and that 
their discourse they are primarily preoccupied with questions pertaining to national 
identity and national security, where elites are seen responsible for a cultural and political 
threat against their idealized image of their nation state. Labelling the radical right as 
populist, focusing on their black and white world view of simple solutions can take away 
attention from what is said to how it is said. However, populist elements accompanied 
with PRR rhetorical tools must also not be ignored, since they serve an important role in 
political mobilization, political culture and discourse and overall course of polity, 
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dragging it against and challenging core values that, for now, still dominate the western 
world that are best described in The Treaty on the functioning of the European Union 
(2012) paragraph two: ‘The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, 
freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States 
in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and 
equality between women and men prevail.’. The root of the problem with the News Right 
as opposed to the New Left lies in the ability to be considerate towards each other’s 
differences – while left-wing recognizes everybody’s equal right for freedom and 
individuality to choose who they are, where is their home, who they want to follow and 
what to believe, than right-wing acknowledges the rights of certain nationalist groups 
over others, denying the liberties for some people that left sees as fundamental for 
everybody, therefore excluding a large part of the society. The PRR in-group out-group 
criteria (Table 1.2.) demonstrates the certain ‘right’ group of people’s right to superiority 
that comes at the expense of the other group(s) through justification. 
Table 1.2. According to Minkenberg (2017) and Heitmeyer (2005, through Minkenberg, 
2017: 15) there are in-group/out-group criteria in right-wing radical discourse, that results 
in the presented assessments.  
Criteria  Definition How it expresses in PRR 
discourse 
Racism Inferiority of the ‘other’ on 
the grounds of biological 
difference 
‘natural’ hierarchy 
Anti-Semitism Special case of racism here understood as modern as 
opposed to traditional anti-
Semitism 
Ethnocentrism Superiority of own 
collectivity on the grounds of 
cultural and economic 
achievements 
developmental differentiation 
Xenophobia Defensive reaction against 
ethnic and cultural ‘others’ 




Nativism Special case of xenophobia in immigration countries the 
rejection of foreign influences 
regardless of ethnicity 
Religiocentrism 
(Fundamentalism) 
Superiority of own 
collectivity on the grounds of 
a particular faith and 
exclusionary access to ‘truth’ 
 
Heterophobia Intolerance to deviation from 
mainstream norms 
unacceptability of moral 
‘others,’ also within own 
ethnicity 
 
Müller (2018: 39) argues that the idea of PRR is a disastrous political idea since 
democracy cannot be improved with anti-pluralism. The claim that the society is 
pluralistic is a fact, not an assessment to be argued over. PRR parties however want an 
ethnocracy for real and pure ordinary citizens they claim to represent (Betz and Johnson, 
2004: 312). According to Müller (2018: 52) and Minkenberg (2017: 14) populism is a 
peculiar moralistic, romantic ultra-nationalist imagination or a myth where morally pure 
and completely united nation stand against corrupt and morally petty elite, however 
completely fictional. Populism’s monistic views and uncompromising stand leads to a 
polarized society and its majoritarian extremism denies legitimacy to opponent’s views 
and weakens the rights of minorities. Populists disrespect various legitimate norms, for 
example they redefine otherwise universal human rights as a priority right of the 
indigenous people as the actual victim in their homeland. Their discursive rhetoric is ripe 
with attacks and racist insults that they claim is freedom of speech that the other side is 
just trying to muzzle – rejecting respect for differences completely. 
 
1.2. PRR in Post-Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
Eastern Europe countries carry with them a legacy of communism, which challenges the 
new liberal-democratic order, including the EU, and has in different ways effected the 
political culture, party competition and a general idea of politics and nation-building, 
where the legacy of former authoritarian regimes is often exploited by PRR parties 
(Minkenberg, 2017; Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018; Norocel and Szabo, 
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2019). Most of Eastern Europe was subject to multinational empires, that is the Habsburg, 
the Russian and the Ottoman empires, where the dominant pattern was the emergence of 
a national identity without the nation-state after World War I, that was soon again 
replaced by authoritarian dictatorships in the interwar period and communist regimes 
after World War II (Minkenberg, 2017: 144-145). They tend to proclaim nostalgia for the 
old despotic regimes and the ethnic and territorial conception (Minkenberg, 2017: 144). 
Therefore, territorial revisionism and identity politics are important in the agenda of many 
PRR parties, including EKRE.  
With the EU’s enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the process of political transformation in 
Eastern Europe took a turn where systemic opposition was marginalized and the radical 
right was far from being a serious political force (Minkenberg, 2017). However, the past 
few years have been a period of growth for most PRR parties in Europe. The success of 
this party family, as well as their organizational structure, ideology, influence and support 
base, has somewhat differed between Western and Eastern Europe. In Western Europe, 
immigrants, especially Muslims, are the primary target, in Eastern Europe, historical 
memory has been one of the driving forces, along with the legacy of state socialism and 
issues that arose from the transformation (Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018; 
Minkenberg 2015; Minkenberg, 2017). In central and eastern Europe, so-called Visegrád 
countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland – are governed by populist 
parties that are attacking core liberal institutions such as the independent judiciary and 
free press. including Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński’s Law 
and Justice in Poland. In many of these countries exists groups that use symbols of the 
fascist movements and regimes of the 1930s and 1940s, such as Hungary’s Arrow Cross 
movement or anti-Western ultra-Catholicism in Poland (Minkenber, 2017: 76). 
With the refugee crisis of 2015, however, the key differences between the PRR in Eastern 
and Western Europe diminished and Islamophobia took hold in Eastern Europe as well. 
The exception being the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), the Slovak National 
Party (SNS) and the Latvian National Alliance, PRR parties in Central and Eastern 
Europe have not enjoyed the same success as their Western counterparts (Kasekamp, 
Madisson and Wierenga, 2018). While Estonia was not the subject to heavy immigration 
flow, opposition to immigration was and is one of the main topics of EKRE’s political 
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discourse during the immigration crisis and after. In elections of 2019 EKRE came in 
third getting 17,8 per cent of votes. President Kersti Kaljulaid gave the opportunity to 
form a government to the Reformist Party, that won the election with 28,9 per cent of 
votes. However, the Center Party, that came in second with 23,1 (Parliament Elections 
Webpage, 2019) per cent of votes, who Reformists invited to form the coalition with, 
rejected the proposal. Kaljulaid had to propose the formation of the coalition to the Center 
Party, which then formed the coalition with EKRE and Pro Patria. EKRE’s chairman Mart 
Helme received the position of minister of the interior and Martin Helme as the minister 
of finance.  
Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) state, historical legacies have influenced 
Estonia and the PRR through the role of ethnic minorities, most of which arrived in 
Estonia during the Soviet occupation, which makes this party family in the region 
different from its counterparts in Western Europe. Trumm (2018: 333) explains EKRE 
reaching power based on other countries similar experiences through four categories – 
PRR have been successful in countries with proportional electoral systems, where media 
has given PRR most coverage, where voters distrust of politicians is based on historical 
legacies and availability for political space. 
Many parties in the populist radical-right family publicly appraise Russia as an 
ideological alternative to a decadent and crumbling EU, for example the PRR in Hungary. 
This is not the case for EKRE and indicates a major difference with the majority of other 
PRR parties. EKRE sees an alternative to a Brussels as elite-driven EU in the form of a 
nationalist and conservative alliance of European nationalists (Kasekamp, Madisson, 
Wierenga, 2018: 55). Despite the successful integration of the new post-communist 
democracies into the European Union, the quality of democracy has suffered setbacks in 
some countries (Minkenberg, 2017: 1), however Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga 
(2018: 50) argue it is not the case in Estonia, as EKRE does not pose a direct threat to 
democracy.  
 
1.3. Xenophobic Nationalism with Euroscepticism as the Host Ideology  
According to Mudde (2007; 2016a) and Rydgren (2017), xenophobic nationalism is one 
of the most important keys to the success of the PRRs. Wodak (2015: 2) argues that PRR 
25 
 
parties across Europe and beyond combine different political imaginaries from nationalist 
pasts in the form of identity narratives – parties in Austria, Hungary, Italy, Romania and 
France recapture fascist and Nazi pasts; parties in Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Sweden 
and Switzerland focus on a perceived threat from Islam; in Hungary, Greece, Italy and 
the UK parties pursue propaganda perceived by the threat from minorities and migrants; 
and in US traditional Christian, fundamentalist approach is in the agenda of parties. Betz 
(2018: 151) and Minkenberg (2017) say that over the past few decades, the PRR has 
advanced a number of reasons why migration poses a fundamental threat to society, 
ranging from simple economic ones to relatively complex cultural justifications, calling 
nativism ‘an ideology of exclusion supported by a narrative of justification’. The concept 
of ‘nativism’ is a version of xenophobia directed at all threats – imagined and real – to 
the native population’s identity and homogeneity (Mudde, 2007: 18–19).  
‘Today’s EU is a very different beast than the European Economic Community of the 
1980s,’ says Mudde (2016b: 104) and elaborates that the Great Recession of 2008 brought 
into the bright daylight what the European values – integration and solidarity – really 
mean. Mudde (2016b: 77) claims that for decades European integration was an elite-
driven process supported by a ‘permissive consensus’ of the masses, while the masses 
were hardly involved in shaping the process. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 
brought with it a rise of ‘Euroscepticism,’ since, the treaty transformed the mainly 
economic European Community into a much more political and social European Union, 
so permissive consensus was no longer a given (Mudde, 2016b: 77), this was followed 
by the rejection of the European Convention in 2005 by France and the Netherlands that 
held referendums. While Euroscepticism has for long been limited to minor parties on the 
political fringes, notably on the radical left and right, it has well established itself in 
today’s political mainstream (Mudde, 2016b: 77). Before Brexit and during the seventh 
term of European Parliament the European Conservatives and Reformists was the third 
largest group with 77 MEP’s7.  
The PRR, including EKRE, perceive EU as ‘a supranational entity, governed by the 
guiding principle of postmodern multiculturalism, which often endeavours to import 
 
7 However, due to British Tories leaving European Parliament, European Conservatives and Reformist 
gained 61 MEP seats in 2019 elections and are now the sixth-largest group in the parliament. 
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‘alien’ cultural norms into the two societies’ (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019: 7). 
Vasilopoulou (2018: 1) states that PRR parties might adopt dissimilar positions on the 
principle, practice and future of European integration, but they all tend to criticise the EU 
from a predominantly sovereignty-based perspective justified on ethno-cultural grounds 
and they increase emphasis over these positions over time. Although immigration as a 
driver for supporting PRR parties is has been established as a problem in both the Western 
and Eastern Europe, portraying immigrants as the scapegoats, Eastern Europe tends to 
focus more on seeing the ethnic minorities as victims, which was also the most important 
narrative for EKRE’s 2015 election campaign (Trumm: 2018: 341).  
Bornschier (2018) argues that the PRR and their electorate are the outcome of the ‘losers 
of modernization’ unable to go along with the economic and global transition for Central 
and Eastern Europe, because they tend to disapprove of universalistic principles and 
defend authoritarian and traditional values along with monoculturalism. The PRR are 
seen as leaders of counterrevolution against social changes brought on by the new left. 
Petsinis (2019: 225) argues that an emerging nexus appears to be strongly knitted inside 
the Eurosceptic and anti-establishment narratives of PRR parties in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which is based upon domestic ethnopolitics, regional geopolitics and ‘new’ 
identity politics. Bornschier (2018: 319) claims todays PRR of Western Europe got 
inspiration from the French nouvelle droite, a far-right political movement that emerged 
during the late 1960s that rejected being characterized as fascist. This can be applicable 
to characterize far-right in Eastern and Central Europe today. 
The nativist narratives in PRR EU agenda are especially appealing in Estonia, rather than 
elsewhere in the EU, due to the historical and sociocultural specifics that help render this 
socio-psychological strategy (Petsinis, 2019: 225; Wierenga, 2017). EKRE qualifies as 
PRR party (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019; Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018; 
Petsinis, 2019; Wierenga, 2017; Wierenga, 2019), since PRR party’s core ideology is 
combined with xenophobic nationalism – opposition to immigration, multiculturalism, 
political elite, while supporting authoritarianism claiming to represent the ‘pure’ ordinary 
citizens (Mudde, 2007; Mudde, 2016a; Betz, 2018; Minkenberg, 2017). Moreover, EKRE 
gained popularity by opposing EU’s immigration policy, Euroscepticism, driven by 
xenophobic nationalism ensured EKRE’s popularity during and after the immigration 
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crisis (Petsinis, 2019: 225; Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018; Braghiroli and 
Petsinis: 2019; Makarychev and Sazono, 2019; Wierenga, 2017; Wierenga, 2019). 
EKRE’s youth organization the Blue Awakening (Sinine Äratus) describes the ideal 
world as Intermarium8 – a widespread idea among Eastern European nationalists of a 
geopolitical union of countries between Russia and Western Europe, extending from the 
Baltic to the Black Sea (Wierenga, 2017). In order to achieve that forces, need to be united 
between Poles and Ukrainians, Hungarians and Romanians, Croats and Serbs to stand 
against the Eastern enemy – Russia – and against the Western enemy – the EU. 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian PRR parties signed Bauska declaration9 in 2013, just 
one year after EKRE emerged, by which they affirmed the supremacy of the sovereignty 
of their peoples over supranational institutions and opposed any attempt to include their 
independent nation states in the United States of Europe, setting up framework of 
cooperation of PRR of Baltic states in order to maintain and protect nationalism and 
conservative values. EKRE and National Alliance affirmed their struggle for national 
sovereignty against supranational institutions and opposition to postmodern values such 
as LGBT rights or multiculturalism (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019: 15; Wierenga, 2017: 
11). This way EU is portrayed as the enemy standing for everything opposite of EKRE 
and everything that could possibly go wrong, like even further loose of sovereignty 
through immigration and integration politics. However, the Latvian For Fatherland and 
Freedom/National Alliance falls under third ‘compromising’ category and became much 
more pro-EU from 2006 to 2014 (Vasilopoulou, 2018: 8). Latvian National Alliance and 
the True Finns are parties with whom EKRE has the closest relationship with, therefor 
placing them between Nordic and Eastern Europe, that Wierenga (2017: 7, 10-11) claims 
makes them even more of a unique case.  
Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019: 6) base EKRE’s Euroscepticism as three-dimensional: 
geopolitical, socio-cultural, and economic – the latter being most irrelevant with only 
 
8 Sinine Äratus webpage. (2017). Ruuben Kaalep intermariumi konverentsil: Ida-Euroopa peab ühendama 
jõud. Visited 10.05.2020, https://sininearatus.ee/2017/04/28/ruuben-kaalep-intermariumi-konverentsil-ida-
euroopa-peab-uhendama-joud/  





attempt to interlink the economy with national survival, where criticism is focused on 
bailing other EU states. Their main argument lies on demographic issues – ‘older’ 
historical legacies from the Soviet era, as well as ‘newer’, the refugee question aspects, 
of identity politics (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019: 6; Petsinis, 2019). According to 
Vasilopoulou (2011), the European Union's opposition in the PRR narratives can be 
divided into three: complete adversary, conditional and willing to compromise. 
Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) place EKRE in a conditional category 
because, while being Eurosceptic, the European Union is not as big an enemy as is Russia 
and because they are willing to cooperate with EU institutions so long as they do not 
compromise national sovereignty.  
However, the nativist discourse of EKRE claiming to stand for indigenous Estonians is 
in some ways ‘muddy’ and there seems to be contradicted due to different understandings, 
which past is the past that is longed for and tried to re-create. An example is minister Mart 
Järvik’s10 vision to bring back agriculture and rural economy of the 1930’s, when ‘The 
farms flourished due to using various tricks and I also hope to start the countryside so that 
people who have gone to the city or to Finland, Sweden and Norway would also like to 
return to the country’.  
Makarychev and Sazonov (2019: 454) interviewed a Russian-speaking member of ‘Blue 
Awakening’, who suggested that conservatively oriented Russophones might be 
sympathetic to views expressed by right-wing nationalist, Jaak Madison admitted that 
residents of the mostly Russian speaking districts of Lasnamäe and Maardu in the Tallinn 
metropolitan area, being under the influence of Russian propaganda, distrust Muslims and 
refugees. Wierenga (2017: 14-15) had conducted similar research two years prior to 
Makarychev and Sazonov by interviewing Keskerakond (The Middle Party) and EKRE 
politicians and reaching the same crux, that EKRE’s EU narratives that go hand in hand 
with Russian EU narratives (Wierenga, 2017: 9). This can be named one of the main 
issues, other mainstream parties tend to exclude EKRE. Arvo Aller, the Minister for Rural 
 
10 Uued Uudised webpage. (2019). Uus maaeluminister Mart Järvik: näen Eestit sellisena, nagu 1930. 





Affairs, said in an interview that due to the restriction of foreign labour, students could 
be sent to fields to gather the agricultural products. ‘/…/ we find high school students, 
schoolchildren, students /…/ all opportunities must be used. Each new is a reminder of 
the old’, said Aller and added that the high school student should always have the 
opportunity to help [in agriculture], be it picking potatoes, picking cabbage, which gives 
good physical exertion (Sildam, 2020). This setting is similar to times Estonia was under 
the Soviet Occupation and working in collective farms as much as normalcy as obligation 
in order to serve the country. 
EKRE sees Estonia as a victim of both EU liberalism and Russian imperialism, portraying 
the EU as ‘the other’ in its discourse (Makarychev and Sazonov, 2019: 462-463). The 
Euroscepticism of EKRE and a number of other PRR parties in the European Union might 
be largely due to the disappointment in the EU, which has failed to tackle immigration 
problem that derives from the principle of open borders for people to move freely 
(Wierenga, 2019). However, Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States, did 
not experience largescale immigration from outside of Europe due to the migrant crisis 
of 2015, the numbers who arrived in Estonia and Latvia were incredibly low. Therefor 
Wierenga (2019) argues that only the threat of potentially large numbers of migrants from 
Africa and the Middle East arriving in countries with a small population was used by 
radical right actors.  
 
1.4. Rhetorical ‘Toolbox’ of PRR  
In this research political discourse and rhetoric are defined through van Dijk’s and 
Condor’s, Billig’s and Tieleaga’s definitions. A discourse can be studied as contextual 
functionality of text and talk, in political discourse the main actors and authors are 
politicians themselves, however political discourse as a whole includes numerous actors 
and recipients since the ‘interaction’ takes place in public sphere among huge audiences 
and therefor bringing in media discourse and opinions of numerous people with numerous 
views (van Dijk, 1998). Political rhetoric is a mix of political argument, debate, 
communication, or discourse serving a number of communicative functions 
simultaneously (Condor, Billig and Tieleaga, 2013). When looking at the political 
rhetoric of a PRR political platform, the course of the discourse is mostly definite. 
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intentional. In political discourse narratives serve as constructions of facts that bound 
together in order to interpret political reality and therefore play a crucial role in political 
decision making individually and in different collective units Patterson and Monroe 
(1998: 315-316).  
Wodak (2015) states that PRR actively use a ‘toolbox’ of rhetorical tools in their 
discourse that help them achieve their goals, that consists of discursive strategies for 
implementing victim-attacker roles, stigmatization, confrontation and construction of 
conspiracy theories. Greven (2016: 1) claims, that PRR strategically and tactically use 
negativity in political communication, tools ranging from the calculated break of 
supposed taboos, disrespect of formal and informal rules, emotional appeals and personal 
insults, conspiracy theories and violent metaphors alongside with refusal of compromise 
and demand on radical solutions. Conflicts are something PRR parties thrive upon in 
order to gain room and attention in the political arena, a certain conflicts potential being 
country specific (Bornschier, 2018: 326). PRR political narratives are discursive 
constructs that respond to three key questions: what went wrong, who is to blame and 
what is to be done to resolve the situation (Betz, 2018: 140). The attribution of blame and 
the stand ‘us versus them’ have been central and enduring features of populist discourse. 
Playing with people's fears, is another strategy of PRR, such as fear of losing their job to 
an immigrant or fear of depriving an independent state of self-determination (Wodak, 
2015) in order to gain people's sympathy. Thousands of articles have been devoted to the 
‘politics of fear’ towards ‘others’ in recent decades where stereotypical images of 
immigrants being authoritarian and violent and causing an apocalyptic future of 
Islamising Europe and oppressing national people (Mudde, 2016b: 79).  
The racist discourse that the PRR call ‘right to identity’ serves as a rhetorical tool to 
counter charges of xenophobia, racism and extremism (Betz, 2018: 152) claiming to be 
and represent the ‘true’ democrats (Betz and Johnson, 2004: 311-312). Emotion, 
especially resentment has been argued to have important role in political mobilisation of 
PRR supporters (Betz, 2018: 143). Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019) compared EKRE’s and 
its Latvian counterpart National Alliance’s socio-psychological campaigns, which both 
interlinked immigration to the collective memories of ‘colonization’ under the Soviet 
Union and the collective anxieties of becoming oppressed again. They argue that this 
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served as a socio-psychological key strategy that enabled both parties to augment their 
public appeal. 
The themes in EKRE’s discourse in Uued Uudised are seen as the main topics through 
which EKRE addresses the EU. According to Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018: 
49-52) negative attitudes toward membership in the EU and European integration are 
most important themes in Uued Uudised sub-themes, while reluctance to help the 
countries that suffered from the European debt crisis; strong opposition to refugee quotas; 
optimistic visions of an Intermarium as an alternative to the EU related to European 
integration, are the sub-themes. The themes, geopolitical and sociocultural approach, 
which are tightly bound with identity politics and were named relevant characterizations 
for EKRE’s Euroscepticism by Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019: 6) were also considered.  
The topic of the refugee crises is most explicitly articulated by relying on the frame of 
conspiracy theory, EKRE media content expresses conspiracy theories that construct a 
pyramid-shaped system of conspirators – at the top level of this system is the secret and 
extremely powerful decadent elite that aims at undermining nation-states (Kasekamp, 
Madisson, Wierenga, 2018: 55). Madisson (2016: 192) claims that conspiracy theories 
give extreme rightists a chance to translate their feelings of intolerance, fear, anger and 
moral superiority into a more tangible and explicit language so it serves as a handy 
rhetorical tool and a ‘connector of the idea of decadent forces, acting in secret, with timely 
topics and actual unpleasant events’. More specifically, according to Madisson (2016: 
194-195) the New World Order conspiracy theory – about dreadful acts of political elite 
whose goal is to create global centralized regime, in order to undermine and ridicule PRR 
sacred values and markers, like race, national sovereignty, nativism, Christian values, 
moral, traditional family values and gender roles – ‘roofs’ most conspiracy theories of 
right extremists. She adds that in Estonian Vernacular Web11, in 2014, Estonia’s 
government was already seen as a powerless sub-branch of the huge decadent system 
(Madisson, 2016: 194-195).  
 




Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018: 55) explain, that the all-embracing 
explanatory frameworks attract disseminators because they offer a simple and more-or-
less coherent explanation of the extremely complex state of affairs and adopt the 
standpoint of a moral victim of the manipulations of malicious forces, offering an 
empowering position of becoming a debunker of a systematic plot. Even more, they unite 
into their syncretic explanation most of the key topics of radical-right discourse: the 
subversion of nation-states and family values, the dark deeds of local and global elites, 
the corrupt nature of the mainstream media and the educational system, the decadent 
foundations of liberal and left-wing ideologies and the danger posed by Muslim 
immigrants with mainstream journalism understood as the tool that conspirators use for 
retarding the critical thinking of citizens (Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018: 54). 
PPR claim to speak honestly and straightforwardly, this should not be confused with ‘new 
realism’. Prins and Saharo (2010) say ‘new realism’ as a genre in Western Europe is 
gaining popularity, that which is based on addressing and talking about thing as they 
really are, not as being constructed by the elite – this includes breaking taboos, speaking 
out frankly about societal ills, standing up for ordinary people and affirming the positive 
sides of the Western value system and of national identity. PRR use the brutally 
straightforward approach, however in a way that is most useful or best for them, often 
twisting and changing the meaning of their sayings later claiming others understood them 
wrong – which it is not objective harsh observation as described by new realism. Atton 
(2006: 574, 586) researched the discourse of The British National Party and concluded 
that its uses the tropes of multiculturalism, equality and freedom to maintain an 
ideological space where racism and repression may appear natural and common-sensical, 
while actually being anti-multicultural, anti-equality and anti-freedom perceiving the 
racist discourse as a normal one.  
PRR parties claim mainstream media, as one of institutions, to be under the control of the 
elites, therefore not trustworthy and even hostile against them due to their controversial 
values. Science Journalist and PhD Journalism Professor Marju Himma (2019) states that 
the politicians are undermining the role of media because do not want it to monitor and 
publicly reveal their, often dark, actions. Himma (2019) adds that the press needs to serve 
as an institution alongside the legislative, executive and judicial branches and act as a 
33 
 
fourth power constantly monitoring the first three and to providing the public with 
information, criticism and debate about them. She (2019) adds that the main problem that 
politicians undermining media, bring along, is losing the trust between media consumers 
and journalists questioning whether the public, or the people, still know and understand 
the importance of what the press is doing for them. Himma (2019) argues that as 
journalists distance themselves from their readers, viewers and listeners, the idea of doing 
this work disappears, saying ‘The closer the press is to power, the further it stands from 
the people.’. I argue that PRR manipulative rhetoric – blaming, discursive strategies, fear 
attribution and pressing on feeling of security – serve as important actors in EKRE’s 
discourse about EU. 
Mainstream media might be considered a victim of its own principles, which so far had 
served it well, however, now are being exploited in their advantage by right-wing 
populists. Journalism Scientist Tiit Hennoste (2008) names seven core values, that makes 
the reporting newsworthy: freshness, geographical and emotional closeness, influence, 
prominence, conflict, topical/timely and uniqueness. The more the values, the more 
important and relevant the news piece. PRR discursive rhetoric is ripe with these 
categories. EKRE politicians coarse, racist, sexist, angry, conflict provoking, etc. 
discourse in mainstream media is also a precedent as it is new and unique, but also 
prominent since EKRE is a relatively new party that reached power very quickly, even 
though they didn’t win the election, but came in third, in 2018. Since EKRE has minister 
seats and is the implementor or day-to-day politics, that effect everyday life of Estonian 
people, emotional and geographical closeness lies with both supporters and non-
supporters of EKRE. 
 
1.5. Discursive Opportunities of the PRR  
Visibility in the public discourse, including both positive and negative media reporting, 
is crucial for PRR parties in order to gain popularity and increase support among voters 
(Norocel and Szabo, 2019; Norocel, Szabo and Bene, 2017; Koopmans and Muis, 2009; 
Koopmans and Olzak, 2013; Ellinas, 2009; Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga; 2018). 
Moreover, their electoral success depends on the number of channels and the amount of 
‘screen time’ that the PRR actors are given (Norocel and Szabo, 2019). Ellinas (2009: 
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209-210) says that the media helps extreme-right parties overcome their organisational or 
financial deficiencies, because media enables them to reach much broader audiences, than 
through their own smaller platforms. Nowadays with a growing apathy towards 
mainstream politics, market pressures compel journalism to continuously search for 
political actors that would generate public interest and attract new audiences, to which 
unconventional rhetorical style of PRR, is perfect (Ellinas, 2009: 220). 
Unarguably media has played an important role and is partially responsible for the 
radicalization of public discourse by covering the ‘groundbreaking’ topics that the PRR 
parties provide, since PRR are able to exploit the negative coverage to their advantage 
(Norozel and Szabo, 2019: 4). Koopmans and Muis (2009) studied the rise of right-wing 
populist Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands in 2002 and concluded that discursive 
opportunities significantly affected Fortuyn’s successful election, since until 2002 no 
party with anti-immigration stance had come to power. The key components for winning 
17 seats in the parliament were the competition for voter support and him dominating 
media discourse – both positive and negative publication helped to diffuse his viewpoints 
and to become the main political opinion-maker during the turbulent election campaign 
(Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 642). It is important to emphasize the fact that immigration 
figures were relatively stable during the 1990s and had been declining since 2000 and the 
country’s economy was healthy (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 642). Similarly, EKRE was 
the most the party that got the most media coverage in 201912, the year when Parliament 
elections in Estonia took place. Also, Mart and Martin Helme were named 2nd and 4th 
most influential Estonian people in 2019 by Eesti Päevaleht13, naming Mart Helme more 
important than Estonian President, Kersti Kaljulaid, who was put on 2nd place. Also, in 
2016, while EKRE had a few seats in the Parliament in the opposition and was known for 
voicing against immigration and had a lot media coverage, at some point Mart Helme was 
named as the most popular candidate for President of Estonia by people (Pärgma, 2016).  
 
12 Kõige enam tähelepanu saanud erakond oli möödunud aastal EKRE. (2019). ERR, 31. December. Visited 
7.05.2020, https://www.err.ee/1019118/koige-enam-tahelepanu-saanud-erakond-oli-moodunud-aastal-
ekre  
13 Eesti mõjukad 2019. (2020). Delfi. Visited 12.05.2020, https://epl.delfi.ee/z/mojukad2019/  
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At worst, there may become a link between violence and public discourse, as happened 
in Germany, where media attention and public visibility, resonance and legitimacy of 
right-wing violence affected the rate of violence against different target groups, like 
ethnic minorities (Koopmans and Olzak, 2004). Some incidents, where ethnic minorities 
have been attacked either during a protest14 or just in public15, EKRE’s public discourse 
has not been directly violence provoking. However, EKRE annually holds the Big 
Torchlight March in the evening of Estonian Independence Day, 24th of February, where 
hundreds of people take part marching through Tallinn. The goal of this, according to 
Mart Helme, Chairman of the Conservative People's Party, is to ‘show that freedom and 
the right to decide our own lives are important to us’ and that the torch is a symbol of 
light and freedom, which are very much needed in these difficult times16.  
Vasilopoulou (2018: 1-2) says that mainstream parties across EU have long refrained 
from politicizing EU in order to not have to deal with EU’s reputational damage. This has 
made room for the PRR to engage in issue competition – bring new topics into political 
agenda claiming it to be core of their agenda – making EU as central to such 
entrepreneurial strategies (Vasilopoulou, 2018: 1-2). Moreover, Pytlas an Kossack (2015: 
129) proved based on their research on four Central and Easter EU countries – Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Romania – that ‘successful PRR parties have the power to place 
their core issues of identity politics on the agenda, frame them according to their ideology 
and force other parties to react and position themselves on these issues.’. Calling it 
‘lighting the fuse’ (Pytlas an Kossack, 2015) and keeping it ‘lit’. Kasekamp, Madisson 
and Wierenga (2018: 48) say that EKRE’s presence in parliament has brought a so-called 
domestic war into the discourse of what is politically correct and have unorthodoxly 
 
14 EKRE's picket in front of the Parliament became violent when Estonian MEP Indrek Tarand was forcibly 
pulled off the stage and he was kicked. Rudi, H. (2018). Galerii ja video: EKRE piketil rünnati Indrek 
Tarandit. Postimees, 26. November. Visited 13.05.2020, https://poliitika.postimees.ee/6462211/galerii-ja-
video-ekre-piketil-runnati-indrek-tarandit  
15 Pihl, A. (2019). Politsei algatas ränderaamistiku meeleavaldusel toimunud intsidendi peale menetluse. 
ERR, 6. February, Visited 8.05.2020, https://www.err.ee/907980/politsei-algatas-randeraamistiku-
meeleavaldusel-toimunud-intsidendi-peale-menetluse  
16 EKRE’s webpage. (2016). Fotod: Vabariigi aastapäeva auks korraldatud tõrvikurongkäigul osales ligi 




voiced their opinions loud, clear and straightforward on topics, such as same-sex unions 
in 2014 and European refugee crisis in 2015. That way creating an unprecedented new 
style of discourse. Which resulted in creation of multiple anti-immigrant blogs, 
information portals and social media groups (Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018: 
48).  
Communication and rhetoric of PRR party family is changing and the use of social media 
is unprecedented for politicians reaching their audience, circumventing the traditional 
medium of broadcast media, however mass media and social media both have served as 
convenient tools for PRR parties to showcase their agendas and engage the public 
(Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018: 47; Wierenga 2019: 140). Through social 
media any political actor can circumvent the mass media and, with a tweet or Facebook 
post and directed to the ‘right people’ (Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018). 
Madisson and Ventsel (2017) claim, that the era of collaborative media can be regarded 
as the era of post-truth, where vernacular authority prevails, or truth is no longer a clear 
fact, but rather the truthfulness lies behind who makes the claim – credible is the mouth 
of the people, not institutional authority such as the press, church or corporation because 
mainstream and elite are considered fundamentally wrong. This plays well in the hands 
of the PRR actors, since two out of three of their key components laying their foundation, 
are authoritarianism as a belief in a hierarchical society and populism as claiming to speak 
for the common folk. The undermining of the mainstream media and journalists, as well 
as other people from ‘elite’ based on the assessment of EKRE political actors, is seen in 
Uued Uudised, where a news article or an interview from mainstream media, often 
portraying one of EKRE’s important political actors, is ‘dissected’ and ‘trounced’ with 
insults, ‘punch lines’ and down playing the content of the news and its authors.   
The characterisation of EKRE’s discourse is supported through Geroge Kirsberg17 (2014: 
20-23) approach that in order to be a successful politician, one has to come up with a new 
idea that people could believe in, for example, the slogan ‘Estonia to become one of the 
 
17 G. Kirsberg wrote a book on political psychology and is a member of the EKRE, however not a prominent 
one. Kirsberg, G. (2014). Poliitika psühholoogilised alused: Mida on vaja poliitika mõistmiseks, Kuidas 
me oma riike mängu paneme. Läänetasandiku OÜ.  
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five richest states of EU’ was never doable. Whether the idea is realistic or doable, makes 
no difference, since politics is nothing but an invention of a religion, that matches with 
the electorate’s mental development stage and relates to associative-analogical network. 
McDonnell’s (2015) study on charismatic populist leaders – Bossi, Berlusconi and 
Blocher – also showed that the ability to believe, have faith and hope towards the leader 
is common among PRR parties’ supporters. Kirsberg (2014: 24) concludes, that when a 
religion is too profoundly obeyed, sense of the world will come deprived and a person 
will interpret the world around him inadequately. 
According to Thomas Greven (2016), PRR parties in the government may momentarily 
cool down in their activities but may also take a dominant position and lead the country 
towards authoritarian and non-liberal arrangements, as happened in Poland and Hungary. 
Since EKRE came to power they have not exactly withdrawn from their aggressive 
negative rhetoric, however, have not been able to push the country towards authoritarian 
and non-liberal style either. EKRE as the only PRR party in Estonia, has ‘a monopoly’ in 
the Estonian political arena, which provides them a lot room for distributing their ideas 
(Petsinis, 2019: 225; Makarychev and Sazonov, 2019: 453). Studying the ‘new’ wave of 
populist rightwing parties in Central and Eastern Europe trying to explain electoral 
support for EKRE, Trumm (2018) found that the two key factors for the party’s success 
in 2015 elections were intense campaigns in the areas and among conservative voters that 
already held resentment towards the establishment and ability to produce an acceptable 
campaign of ‘right kind of disillusionment’. The refugee crisis that occurred shortly after 
EKRE’s electoral breakthrough has greatly expanded the party’s discursive opportunities, 
even though ‘Euroscepticism’ entered the agenda of Estonian discourse with the 
accession of EU in early 2000’s. EKRE’s EU discourse bases its concerns on national 
sovereignty, especially as it relates to the European migration crisis. (Kasekamp, 
Madisson, Wierenga, 2018).  
 
1.6. Uued Uudised and EKRE 
EKRE was founded in 2012 with its predecessor being the People’s Party (Rahvaliit) and 
the Estonian Nationalist Movement (Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine). EKRE quickly went 
from having no seats to seven seats out of 101 in the 2015 national elections and from 
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seven to 19 in the 2019 national elections (Wierenga, 2019), defending traditional family 
values arose as the key issue that propelled EKRE into the Estonian parliament in 2015 
(Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018). Two of the main tactics that have granted 
them to such popularity are grassroots activism and social media engagement (Kasekamp, 
Madisson and Wierenga, 2018).  
With their first year in the coalition EKRE’s ministers have often intervened in other 
Ministries areas of governance, for example defence18. While in power, creating scandals 
claiming to broaden the boundaries of political debate, have been constant. For example, 
insulting the new largely female Finnish government, calling it the lipstick coalition’. 
Also, trying to demolish Estonia’s ‘deep state’ – the dismissal of Estonia’s Attorney 
General, Lavly Perling, and Deputy Secretary General for Internal Security in the 
Ministry of the Interiors, Erkki Koort, the attempted dismissal of the Director General of 
the Police and Border Guard Board, Elmar Vaher, and the constant criticism directed 
towards Estonia’s public sector administration institutions, like Ministries and Boards. 
The routine political discourse with EKRE in government includes offensive and 
aggressive statement from EKRE ministers, regardless of several calls for order from the 
President and Prime Minister. Being the third most popular party in Estonia, with 18% 
support (Erakondade Reitingud Webpage, 2020) and member of the government, EKRE 
has a clear influence on the thinking and behaviour of members of society, which should 
not be underestimated. 
Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018: 48) argue that Uued Uudised is one of the 
most important centres of Estonian PRRs due to being a grass-root channel and having a 
big role in distributing information about the party’s anti-immigration events and 
petitions, they have increased the party’s visibility and influence among the audience that 
does not follow or trust mainstream media and because articles there have been shared in 
social media numerously. It is a relevant channel for studying EKRE’s EU narratives 
because it is about how the EKRE sees EU functioning and how it portrays itself to its 
 
18 Kuusk, J-K. (2019). Mart Helme: kui riigikaitses on teistel ministritel ajusurnud suhtumine, siis tuleb 





supporters. It was created in 2015 – at a time when the immigration crisis was at its peak 
and EKRE support in Estonia started to increase very rapidly. At the same time, an 
average of 3–8 news posts are written per day, which means that visitors know that they 
can expect more news in a day and therefore may visit it more. 
EKRE’s Uued Uudised is rather unique and most actively content producing platform 
compared to the other Estonian parties’ that exceeded the threshold of 5 per cent in 2019 
in Parliament elections. The most similar in content production volume sense, is the news 
outlet Kesknädal19, produced by the second most popular party, the Middle Party 
(Keskerakond), with 24 per cent support, that is also printed in paper and in Russian, their 
webpage has 4-7 new news posts a day. Also, the party Fatherland (Isamaa) with the 
support of 5-6 per cent has their own news portal, called Eesti Uudised20, where 2-3 news 
posts are produced and which still almost two times less than in Uued Uudised, where 
news are posted up to 7 or 8 times a day. Social Democrats (Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraatlik 
erakond), with the support of 8 per cent, post 3-5 news per day on their party’s webpage 
news section21 and Estonia 200 (Eesti 200) with their 7 per cent support usually makes 2-
3 posts a week also in the news section on their party’s webpage22 . The most popular 
party, with almost 32 per cent support, Reformist Party (Eesti Refomierakond) posts news 
in their party webpage23 the most rarely, sometimes leaving up to 10 days between news 
posts. However, the party’s chairman Kaja Kallas writes an online blog24 for political 
topics where approximately 50 posts have been made since 2010. 
However, the social media and other channels should also be taken into consideration 
when looking into the relevance of party’s political discourse outside mainstream media 
and public sphere. Compared to others, EKRE overarchingly dominates this area of 
discourse in number of channels and likes and followers on social media. The 
Conservative People’s Party Facebook page has 17 600 likes, Uued Uudised Facebook 
 
19 Kesknädal webpage. (2020). Visited 14.05.2020, http://kesknadal.ee/  
20 Eesti Uudised webpage. (2020). Visited 14.05.2020, https://eestiuudised.ee/  
21 Eesti Sotsiaaldemokraadid webpage. (2020). Visited 14.05.2020, https://www.sotsid.ee/uudised/  
22 Eesti 200 webpage. (2020). Visited 14.05.2020, https://eesti200.ee/teemad/uudised/  
23 Reformierakond webpage. (2020). Visited 14.05.2020, https://www.reform.ee/uudised  
24 Kaja Kallas Blog. (2020). Visited 14.05.2020, https://kajakallas.ee/postitused/  
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page almost 18 000 likes and its youth assembly, The Blue Awakening (Sinine Äratus) 
Facebook page, over 3000 likes. On Facebook Reformist Party has 12 000 likes with no 
youths’ page, Social democrats 9000 and Young Social Democrats (Noored 
Sotsiaaldemokraadid) 2100 likes, Fatherland 7500 and Middle Party 6400 and Middle 
Party’s Youth Assembly (Kesknoored) Facebook page around 1000 likes. Estonia 200 
has 1800 and its youth assembly Young Estonia 200 (Noor Eesti 200) 210 likes. On top 
of that, EKRE hosts its own radio show ‘Räägime asjast’ in TRE radio channel and is a 
regular guest visitor in Christian Family Radio25. This can be compared to Radio Maryja, 
a Polish Catholic Church radio station that sends strong political messages which combine 
anti-liberal, anti-Western and sometimes anti-Semitic messages with conspiracy theories 
and ultranationalism (Minkeberg, 2017: 71). 
EKRE’s importance in dominating in media’s and social medias discourse, is also 
supported by the alternative media webpage, that EKRE often refers to in Uued Uudised, 
Objektiiv26, with a Christian focus. Objektiiv was not chosen for analysis because it is 
almost twice as less visited then Uued Uudised, 400 thousand27 a month compared to 200 
thousand a month28. Uued Uudised attendance can be compared to the attendance of 
 
25 Tartu Pereraadio describes itself as a Christian charitable organization that is politically independent and 
guided in its activities by the laws in force in the Republic of Estonia. The association is a non-profit 
association founded in 1994, which coordinates the production and distribution of the Christian-educational 
format radio programs ‘Pereraadio’, ‘Semeinoje Radio’ and ‘Radio Eli’. The political independence is 
however questionable, since regularly the shows include Varro Vooglaid, Markus Järvi, the Helmes and 
ohter actors with highly political positions and statements. Pereraadio webpage. (2020). Visited 14.05.2020, 
http://www.pereraadio.ee/uus/  
26 Objektiiv is a alternative news and opinion portal, with a large amount of similar content to Uued 
Uudised, however created by the Foundation for the Protection of Family and Tradition in 2015 that 
describes itself as a platform for views that are in line with the fundamental conservative values of our 
culture, which are severely under-represented in the narrow-minded liberal and left-leaning mainstream 
that is taking over the Western world. Objektiiv webpage. (2020). Portaalist. Miks on portaal Objektiiv ellu 
kutsutud?. Visited 14.05.2020, https://objektiiv.ee/portaalist/ 
27 Similarweb. (2020). Uueduudised.ee. Visited, 15.05.2020, 
https://www.similarweb.com/website/uueduudised.ee  
28 This number consists consuming the digital content both through desktop and mobile devices in order to 
understand a site’s overall digital presence and performance. Bohm, J. (2020). Total Traffic for Any 
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portal Eesti.ee29, which provides government information and e-services for a citizen, for 
an entrepreneur and for an official. It holds notarial documents, health information, 
financial support and employment information, etc. that can be accessed through logging 
in withs social security number or ID. Also, Estonia is the second country in the EU after 
the Czech Republic with the highest number, almost 60 per cent30, of people who identify 
as unaffiliated with a religion. Furthermore, around 54 per cent of Estonians believes in 
some sort of higher power, however only 18 per cent of Estonians believes in the 
existence of God (Heelas, 2013: 179).  
Although Uued Uudised webpage design may leave an impression of a regular news 
portal, since it has different divisions, Front Page, Opinion, Shows, Estonia, World, 
Economy, etc. its name is ‘National Conservative News and Opinion portal’. It qualifies 
as an alternative media channel of PRR. Alternative media’s central value is to close off 
certain other abilities to speak in order to sustain a community with closure (Couldry, 
2002, through Atton, 2006: 574). Uued Uudised news posts are only made by EKRE or 
its chosen supporters, so only they can voice opinions, which in a way adds to the plurality 
of channels that defines democracy, although is undemocratic in nature because is not 
pluralistic in content. Atton (2006: 586) states that ‘democratized creativity’, a little space 
for the sharing or exploration of ideas and arguments, is important in alternative media 
formations. Under the posts in Uued Uudised is possible to leave a comment, so there is 
a possibility for argumentation and comments, but no forum. EKRE’s news posts also 
include none of the core principles of writing news, which is why it is not comparable to 
mainstream media and qualifies as alternative. According to Journalism Scientist Tiit 
Hennoste (2008) a classical news piece has to follow three core principles: the author has 
to be objective and not include his or her own opinions, but rely on facts and statements 
of the interviewees, assessments are given by the interviewees; the news has to be 
 
Website and Fresh Mobile Web Data. Visited 14.05.2020, https://www.similarweb.com/corp/blog/total-
traffic-for-any-website-and-fresh-mobile-web-data/ 
29 Similarweb. (2020). Eesti.ee. Visited 13.05.2020, 
https://www.similarweb.com/website/eesti.ee#overview ; Eesti webpage. (2020). Visited 13.05.2020, 
https://www.eesti.ee/et/  




balanced, which means interviewing both or more people to include different sides of the 
story and wording their statements as closely as possible in the article; the news has to be 
punctual – facts need to be checked. Uued Uudised describes itself on the webpage very 
briefly, however thought through: ‘Uued Uudised is published by the Estonian 
Conservative People's Party. Uued Uudised considers the freedom of expression 
important. This means that the views expressed in the Uued Uudised may not coincide 
with the views of the Estonian Conservative People's Party.’31 This means, that Uued 
Uudised is the information channel for EKRE claiming to represent freedom of speech, 
which can be seen as democratic value, however leaving room for possibility of 
withdrawing from responsibility, by saying the content may not coincide with the views 
of EKRE.  
Uued Uudised can be defined as an ‘echo chamber’. This means a closed community 
where already existing beliefs and views are reinforced with repetition, sometimes 
unconsciously, which makes this community live in an information bubble and become 
more polarized (Grömping, 2014; Törnberg, 2018). This is common for alternative 
information seekers and believers, often conspiracy theory believers, like anti-vaxxers 
community, flat earth believers, but also for polarized political views. Social media is an 
opportunistic networking tool for making the content go viral by spreading it (Törnberg, 
2018), supporting the narrative of media and social media being the fuse (Pytlas and 
Kossack, 2015) giving a kick to information virality. One main argument in EKRE’s 
discourse is that they are suppressed by mainstream media that is under the strict 
propagandist control of Brussels and wants to destroy Conservatists, keeping their 
supporters from consuming and believing any other information that they don’t want to. 
Castells (2009: 23) claims the online environment to be crucial for the survival of PRR 
ideas because of its three most relevant features: flexibility – the ability to change 
components and reconfigure, scalability – ability to expand and shrink, survivability – 
networks run by multiple nodes and are very hard to take down.  
The aim of my thesis is to try to understand, without any appraisal, what lies behind 
EKRE's European narratives, which are unquestionably powerful and try to establish the 
role of nativism and populism in this discourse. My aim is to look into the first posts about 
 
31 Uued Uudised webpage. (2020). Visited 10.05.2020, https://uueduudised.ee/  
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EU starting from the year 2015 when EKRE was established up to the year 2019, which 
unarguably play key aspect in EKRE becoming to power, since Euroscepticism is one of 





















2. Methodology: Grounded Theory and Qualitative Analysis 
In this chapter the methodological steps to carry out empirical analysis are covered – 
grounded theory as the methodology and content analysis as the method that was chosen 
for conducting this research are introduced. Explained is, how the research questions and 
the various theorical approaches, described in theoretical chapter as well, helped me 
analyse the EU related themes and topics in the news posts in Uued Uudised. Justification 
for the chosen channel and the explanation for the sample is also provided along with 
elaborating how the coding is carried out with the help of the coding scheme developed 
simultaneously with the empirical coding. 
 
2.1. Grounded Theory as Methodology 
Grounded theory methods consist of systematic, yet flexible guidelines for collecting and 
analysing qualitative data to construct theories 'grounded' in the data themselves 
(Charmaz, 2006: 2-3). Grounded theory that aims to generate well-grounded theory or 
hypotheses based on empirical data, is used because compared to other PRR parties in the 
world, EKRE has been little studied (Wierenga, 2017) and understudied are also their 
European narratives (Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018), so this is the best 
approach to give in depth descriptions in order to understand what is said. An important 
methodological principle of grounded theory is that scientific research is treated as a 
process of getting to know, where every new step tests the knowledge from the previous 
step and adds a new one with simultaneous data collection, coding, analysis and theory 
development (Lepik, Strömpl, 2014).  
In my research I am taking a constructivist (interpretivist) approach. When positivist-
inspired research theory seeks causes, favours deterministic explanations and emphasizes 
generality and universality, then constructivist theory emphasizes understanding rather 
than explanation (Charmaz, 20016). Since my work focuses on understanding how the 
EU is constructed through xenophobic nationalism and populist rhetoric, I go by the 
definition of Charmaz (2006: 126) ‘interpretive theory calls for the imaginative 
understanding of the studied phenomenon. This type of theory assumes emergent, 
multiple realities, indeterminacy, facts and values as linked, truth as provisional and 
social life as processual’.  
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As stated in theory (subchapter 1.3) in this research political rhetoric is defined through 
Condor, Billig and Tieleaga (2013), as a mix of political argument, debate, 
communication, or discourse serving a number of communicative functions 
simultaneously. However, because the contextual functionality of text is produced by the 
main actors of only one side, EKRE’s representatives that write the posts in Uued 
Uudised, the recipient side, the readers of Uued Uudised, is not studied or included in this 
research.  
Thereby I study what is being said and what are, possibly hidden, stories as narratives in 
the texts that reflect the understanding of EU, that the writers of Uued Uudised want to 
project upon their supporters. Patterson and Monroe (1998: 315-316) define narrative in 
political discourse as a ‘construction of disparate facts in our own worlds that are weaved 
together cognitively in order to make sense of reality’ and claim that narrative plays a 
critical role in the construction of political behaviour, since people create and use 
narratives to interpret and understand the political realities around them as individuals but 
also in collective units, as nations or groups. I go by Patterson’s and Monroe’s definition 
of narratives which are identified with the help of content analysis32 and qualitative 
approach. Qualitative coding attaches labels to segments of data that depict what each 
segment is about – coding distils data, sorts them and gives us a handle for making 
comparisons with other segments of data (Charmaz, 2006: 3). 
 
2.2. Content Analysis: Sample and Coding 
The aim of my thesis is to add some insight to the study of the Estonian PRR party, EKRE, 
by exploring one of the main themes that ensured their popularity – Euroscepticism, 
driven by xenophobic nationalism with the help of two research questions.  
Research question 1: How the European Union is constructed in the 
alternative media channel of Estonian PRR Uued Uudised? 
 
32 The researched is carried out with content analysis, not discourse analysis, that might seem to have also 
been considered, since discourse analysis deals with uncovering how those meanings are constructed 
through language. However, in this research content analysis was used in order to identify what the 





Research question 2: How xenophobic nationalism is used in EU narratives 
in the alternative media channel of Estonian PRR Uued Uudised?  
EKRE sees Estonia as a victim of both EU liberalism and Russian imperialism, portraying 
EU as ‘the other’ in its discourse (Makarychev and Sazonov, 2019: 462-463). With the 
help of the first research question ‘How the European Union is constructed in the 
alternative media channel of Estonian PRR Uued Uudised?’ is analysed, whether 
EKRE’s EU critical narrative is based upon the financial crisis, anti-elitism and migration, 
as Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) claimed. Kasekamp, Madisson and 
Wierenga (2018: 49-52) also stated that European integration as a theme in Uued Uudised 
consists of predominantly negative attitudes toward membership in the EU, for example 
that the EU is taking more and more control over the member states, while the most 
important sub-themes related to European integration are: reluctance to help the countries 
that suffered from the European debt crisis; strong opposition to refugee quotas; 
optimistic visions of an Intermarium as an alternative to the EU. Through coding are 
established narratives, how the EU and EU related topics are constructed for the readers 
and what are the dominant narratives used most often. Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019: 6) 
state that EKRE’s Euroscepticism stands on two main pillars, geopolitics, sociocultural, 
which are tightly bound with identity politics.  
Xenophobic nationalism is the host ideology of most PRR parties in EU and the main 
institution scapegoated for denying them their sovereignty is EU. PRR parties have 
advanced several reasons why migration poses a fundamental threat to society, ranging 
from simple economic ones to relatively complex cultural justifications (Minkenberg, 
2017). The PRR rhetorical strategies therefor play an undeniably important role in the EU 
narratives. The second research question ‘How xenophobic nationalism is used in EU 
narratives in the alternative media channel of Estonian PRR Uued Uudised?’ helps 
me to untangle the usage of nationalism, identity politics and imaginaries from nationalist 
past (Wodak, 2015: 2) knitted into the EU narratives. Perhaps through coding it is possible 
to bring some clarity into the ‘muddiness’ of EKRE’s nativist discourse, as there seem to 
be different understandings, which past is the past that is longed for and tried to re-create 
– is it the one in between the World Wars or something more recent. Although Estonia 
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was not the target country for large numbers of asylum seekers (Wierenga, 2019), 
interlinking immigration to collective memories of ‘colonization’ served as a socio-
psychological strategy of victimising Estonians and portraying EU and the forced 
immigration policies as the new oppressors who trie to re-colonize Estonia, helped EKRE 
to mobilize its electorate in 2015 (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019; Petsinis, 2019; Trumm: 
2018: 341).  
Therefore playing on people’s anxieties and feelings of insecurity and emotion overall, 
as Betz (2018: 143) argued, play important role in political mobilisation of PRR 
supporters. Taken into account are Wodak’s (2015) ‘toolbox rhetoric’ of discursive 
strategies for implementing victim-attacker roles, stigmatization, confrontation and 
construction of conspiracy theories (that also Madisson (2016) described), as well as 
playing on people’s fears and feeling on security scapegoating immigrants (also Mudde, 
2016b), that PRR use to achieve their goals. Greven’s (2016: 1) claim of PRR strategically 
and tactically using negativity – tools ranging from the calculated break of supposed 
taboos, disrespect of formal and informal rules, emotional appeals and personal insults, 
conspiracy theories and violent metaphors alongside with refusal of compromise and 
demand on radical solutions in political communication. Bornschier’s (2018: 326) 
argumentation that PRR parties thrive upon country specific conflict to get attention; 
Betz’s (2018: 140) statement that PRR political narratives are discursive constructs that 
respond to three key questions: what went wrong, who is to blame and what is to be done 
to resolve the situation, since the attribution of blame and the stand ‘us versus them’ have 
been central and enduring features of populist discourse. Also, the role of the emotion 
and resentment in general as Betz (2018: 143) argued plays important role in political 
mobilisation of PRR supporters, moreover whether the socio-psychological approach for 
victimising nativist in the fear of re-colonization (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019) appears. 
Also, whether the racist discourse that the PRR justify with ‘right to identity’ serves as a 
rhetorical tool to counter charges of xenophobia, racism and extremism (Betz, 2018: 152) 
perceiving the racist discourse as a normal one. 
Sample 
According to Charmaz (2006: 17) the quality and credibility of a study starts with the 
data, so the depth and scope of the data make a difference and a study based upon rich, 
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substantial and relevant data stands out. Uued Uudised, not interviewing EKRE members 
or supporters, was chosen because one of their main narratives is that everybody besides 
them are corrupt, not trustworthy and want to take them down. I could not have been sure 
that the interviews would be honest and unbiased conversations rather than scepticism 
towards me, the interviewer who is ‘serving the elite’, therefore the outcome of my 
research might have not been credible. Moreover, EKRE researchers and scientists, like 
Louis Wierenga, Leif Kalev, Vello Pettai33 and others have been publicly ‘condemned’ 
by EKRE as the servers of the other elite side of polarized society. Uued Uudised articles 
are written by EKRE members and supporters for their members and supporters, therefore 
they do not need to try to convince new, possibly different-minded people who might 
disagree with them, but rather keep their followers with spreading certain information the 
way they are used to. That makes Uued Uudised the purest source with most reliable data 
and grounded theory the most accurate method for my small-n research. 
In Uued Uudised averagely 3–8 news posts are written per day, which means that visitors 
know that they can expect more news in a day and therefore may visit it more. My work 
focuses on interpreting Eurosceptic narratives in Uued Uudised, where approximately 
 
33 EKRE accuses Wierenga of being in service of the elite, therefore making up the argument that 
immigrants are bigger enemy than Russians with alleged argument that Russians too have white skin colour. 
EKRE compares this with other scientist James Sherr, who argues that Russians and immigrants are equally 
big enemies and concludes that scientist are unprofessional because are not able to agree on EKRE’s biggest 
enemy. Leif Kalev and Vello Pettai are condemned for saying that EKRE had a weak voice in opposition, 
which according to EKRE was not true. ‘There is one important moment in this whole story - it shows what 
kind of ‘friends’ we have, such as Louis Wiering (or the new Hartleb) ‘EKRE researcher’ of the University 
of Tartu, and our own professors who play games of ‘disappearing Estonian reputation’.’  
Uued Uudised webpage. (2019). Delfi leidis taas ühe meediakanali, kes võtab “EKRE-uurijatelt” vastu 
kõike, mis aitaks Eestit mustata. Visited 12.05.2020, https://uueduudised.ee/uudis/eesti/delfi-leidis-taas-
uhe-meediakanali-kes-votab-ekre-uurijatelt-vastu-koike-mis-aitaks-eestit-mustata/  
*Florian Hartleb was the Eesti 200 member and Tallinn’s University professor who lost his temper during 
the demonstration against immigrants in Freedom Square since he as an immigrant felt he was verbally 
attacked. Tark, I. (2018). Odini sõdalast nüginud Eesti 200 liige avaldas kahetsust ja esitas avalduse 





3,90034 news posts were found when searching for ‘Europe’ on the Uued Uudised portal. 
To have a wide cross-section sample, encoded was every tenth news post since April 27, 
2015, when the first post including the word ‘Europe’ was made, so the rough sample 
consisted of 300 posts, which was approximately 7.7% of all posts. The first round of 
coding stopped reaching 300 due to data saturation – no new narratives or original 
statements had occurred within the last 50 posts, the last post coded was dated 5th of 
August 2019. Out of these 300 posts, 209 posts included one or more narrative relating 
to EU. These posts were re-encoded in depth with the help of memo-writing and coding-
scheme, which was improved throughout both rounds of coding, in-between the codings 
and also after the second coding. 
Coding 
Coding means naming segments of data with a label that simultaneously categorizes, 
summarizes and accounts for each piece of data, so the codes show how to select, separate 
and sort data to begin an analytic accounting of them, which is the first step in moving 
beyond concrete statements in the data to making analytic interpretations (Charmaz, 
2006: 43). In this case a code is a statement about the EU or relating to the EU. For 
example, when EU is just referred to as a geographical area and nothing more, then it is 
not a statement about the EU, however when the EU is called unfair or corrupt multiple 
times, then it is a statement reflecting an attitude towards the EU and therefor may be part 
of a narrative, make up a whole itself or fall under a bigger narrative. The goal was to 
highlight the hidden meanings by using in vivo (alive) codes, where the phrases 
representing the parts of the text are worded as closely as possible and open codes are 
derived directly from text through active reading of text as well as analytical techniques 
used in grounded theory (Kalmus, Masso, Linno, 2015). In vivo codes serve as symbolic 
markers to give meaning to what is said and need to be subjected to comparative and 
analytic treatment. Although the terms may be catchy, in vivo codes do not stand on their 
own in a robust grounded theory and need to be integrated into the larger theory 
(Charmaz, 2006: 55). 
 
34 This was the result in October of 2019, when I started the research. 
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I use inductively deductive coding, which means that the texts are read and some initial 
codes are created based on them, at the same time the text is searched for snippets of text 
that match the codes (Kalmus, Masso, Linno, 2015). This approach was used in both 
rounds of coding, more inductive in the first round and then more deductive in the second 
round of coding, since by then the memos and a coding-scheme were developed that could 
be relied on. Inductive approach was used to map the EU narratives down as closely 
worded as possible to original statements to then develop main narratives and then coding 
scheme from them. Inductive approach was useful since the Euroscepticism of EKRE is 




Figure 2.1. The grounded theory development process by Charmaz (2006: 4). 
 
The first round of coding (Figure 2.1.) all the news post in the final sample of 209 posts 
were read through alongside with writing out all statements relating to EU and snippets 
that help characterize these statements. According to Charmaz (2006: 82) memos should 
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be written from the beginning of and throughout the research, since ‘memos spur you to 
develop your ideas in narrative form and fullness early in the analytic process’. I started 
making comments about the snippets and statements that helped characterize the context 
the statements were used in simultaneously with the first round of coding, which served 
as memos. I went through the collected statements and snippets and tried to establish main 
categories as narratives, which were constructed from similarities and based on 
relationships between the statements found from the first round of coding. Patterson and 
Monroe (1998: 315-316) state that ‘narrative refers to the ways in which we construct 
disparate facts in our own worlds and weave them together cognitively in order to make 
sense of our reality’ and claim that narrative plays a critical role in the construction of 
political behaviour, since people create and use narratives to interpret and understand the 
political realities around them as individuals but also in collective units, as nations or 
groups.  
For example, statements 92, 94 and 95 from the text all support the third level narrative 
‘Estonia should stand with and look up to its Allied nation states (Hungary and Poland, 
US) rather than EU’: ‘The European Commission is conducting criminal proceedings 
against Poland over the reform of the country's judicial system, and Estonia must now 
stand on one side of the front line with Warsaw.’ (92), ‘Viktor Orbán threatened to veto 
the EU's budget plan, which penalizes countries that refuse immigrants’ (94) and ‘So 
what to do? Our cartel parties - the Reform Party, the Center Party, the Social Democrats 
and the IRL - have all shown in power that they do not stand in the way of liquidating the 
nation state and replacing the people. Consequently, there is only one way to stop this 
madness - to give the Estonian Conservative People's Party such an overwhelming 
mandate in the next elections that EKRE would be able to prevent national, economic and 
social destruction. Just as the standing governments of their nations in Poland and 
Hungary have done. As the governments of Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia are 
doing, following the example of these two countries.’ (95).  
Third level narratives, like ‘Estonia should stand with and look up to its Allied nation 
states (Hungary and Poland, US) rather than EU’, ‘Leaving EU leads to freedom of the 
nation state’, ‘Leaving will do good for economy’ and ‘People should stand up against 
immigration policy’ – all support the bigger second level, branch narrative, which is 
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‘Leaving EU or/ and not following its orders is good’. Some statements go under many 
narratives. For example, the following statement ‘Tim Sebastian's seemingly motivating 
desire to portray Martin Helme as a typical lying populist, as the mainstream narrative 
teaches, also seems to have inspired DW. He is not interested in what Martin Helme really 
has to say, but he attacks the interviewee with the obvious aim of trapping another 
extremist racist politician.’ (165) falls under two leaf narratives – ‘Anything that’s 
mainstream, like media, is under the control of Brussels and is used to destroy 
conservatists’ and ‘EU and EU-minded people want to prohibit Conservatives freedom 
of speech, judge them and lie about them, because EU-minded aren’t real democrats’.  
The second round of coding a focused coding, which’s goal is to determine the adequacy 
of those codes by shifting through the data, analysing it and rearranging initial codes to 
categorize the data incisively and completely (Charmaz, 2006: 57-58). I read through all 
the EU statement included posts concurrently using and developed my memos and coding 
scheme. I compared all narratives, aka categories named branch and leaf narratives, to 
see if it was possible to establish main narratives, as ‘root narratives’, under which all 
other smaller narratives and statements could allocate. The third level leaf narratives 
support the second level branch narratives, which support the third level root narratives, 
smaller narratives originate from wide root narratives. The bigger narratives were 
therefore constructed from similarities and based on relationships between the smaller 
narratives. For example:  
2. Only conservatists can help save EU and/ or Estonia (37 posts) 
• Only conservatists know and can give people what they really want because are real 
democrats (12 posts) 
• Conservatists have the solution for stopping terrorism caused by immigration in EU (8 
posts) 
• Everybody else but the ones that support conservatives is in subordination of Brussels 
(4 posts) 
• New conservatism is truth; left liberalism is false (4 posts) (Appendix 1). 
The reason 12+8+4+4 does not equal 28, but 37 because four narratives may have 
occurred in up to nine common news posts, which are counted as one news post not ten 
different news posts, or that root narrative ‘Only conservatists can help save EU and/ or 
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Estonia’ may have occurred in some posts that the four smaller narratives did not and 
these posts did not make up a separate leaf narrative under which they could form. For 
example, a news post about the Mayor of Võru joining EKRE: ‘According to Kaver, the 
Social Democrats are one of the biggest supporters of mass immigration both in Estonia 
and in Europe, which is why it is necessary to oppose it. ‘EKRE is a party that can put an 
end to this wave,’ the mayor of Võru noted.’ (75). This did not fall under any of the leaf 
narratives, but clearly has a message that only EKRE can make things right again for 
Estonia and EU. However, this was rather an exception than the rule. The same logic 
applies throughout the coding scheme (Appendix 1). 
As Charmaz (2006: 82; Figure 2.1.) suggested, throughout the coding some emergent 
categories were taken apart and broken into smaller components in order to further 
develop them through memo-writing. For example, I had first written out a statement: 
‘French President François Hollande has admitted to sending weapons to Syrian rebels 
in 2012, according to a book to be published in France in May. At the time of the arms 
dispatch, Syria was subject to an EU embargo.’(2) and worded a possible narrative ‘EU 
is not uniform, even large Member States do not comply with EU agreements or laws’ 
and added a comment that this statement was about one of the biggest EU member states 
– France – admitting breaking its own laws, which could mean that member states are not 
solidary and lie. This statement, along with other similar statements made up a branch 
narrative in the final coding scheme ‘EU is not an honourable or honest organization’ 
which was supported by leaf narrative ‘EU or its MS break its own laws’, which made up 
the fifth root narrative ‘EU as an organisation doesn’t work’. Before I started coding for 
my thesis, I read Uued Uudised posts daily for about three months to familiarize myself 








3. Empirical Findings from Coding 
In this chapter are represented the findings, narratives, with the help of the coding scheme, 
a three level ‘Narrative Tree’, with comments and explanations. The five most dominant 
narratives (Figure 3.1.) that emerged from the findings are allocated to subchapters: 
‘Being against EU and EU-minded will save EU and nation states’ supported in 133 posts, 
‘EU wants to have (ultimate) power over its member (nation) states’ supported in 129 
posts, ‘Being and supporting EU-minded is dangerous’ supported in 103 posts, ‘EU as an 
organization doesn’t work’ supported in 71 posts and ‘Immigration policy consequences 
break up EU’ supported in 70 posts. Figure 3.1. shows there are two strongest narrative, 
one as a middle one and again two milder ones.  
Figure 3.1. The representation of five biggest narratives out of all 209 posts coded. 
 
 
All five narratives are obviously similar because are negative towards EU and the first 
three narratives are more emotionally loaded, for example ‘Being and supporting EU-
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The five root narratives were supported by 24 branch narratives (Figure 3.2.). For a 
statement to become a leaf narrative it had to be supported by statements in at least three 
different news posts. The minimal amount forming a leaf narrative occurred 9 times out 
of altogether 74 leaf narratives. 
Figure 3.2. Visual representation of the narratives and their allocation in the narrative tree 




3.1. Opposing EU Will Save Nation States 
Root narrative ‘Being against EU and EU-minded will save EU and nation states’ was 
supported by the most – 9 – branch narratives. The most occurred branch narrative ‘EU-
minded won’t be able to destroy conservatists, although they try to’ was supported in 42 
posts. This example from a news post that presents strongly this root as well as this branch 
narrative, because is based on strong presumption that there are two ‘homogeneous’ 
groups, however, one of good conservative people and other, bad EU-minded people – it 
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is common populist approach, which might be used for mobilization of the electorate: 
‘/…/ if Estonia and Europe want to survive, they must pursue national conservative 
policies and resist pressure from the left and liberals /.../ conservatism as a concept and 
ideology has a reputation problem and it is clear where it all comes from: all kinds of 
opinion leaders cultivate attitudes in the media and the general public to be modern, to 
be ashamed of Estonia and to dismantle the nation state, to be liberal, to love gays, 
immigrants and multicultural. Otherwise, we are not real Europeans and our allies do 
not understand us.’ (110) In order to ‘help’ deepen the polarization, the nativist minded 
people are shown at the same time as the repressed ones as heroes standing for the right 
thing that will win eventually, as describes by socio-psychological strategy that helped 
EKRE gain electorate pre-election: ‘Such brainwashing does not change a person's heart, 
but it is safer to put on a ‘modern mask’ in public. /.../ It seems that just as conservative 
ideology is gaining strength in the West, it is possible that Estonian administrators will 
also be able to use literature introducing conservatism.’ (110). 
The previous news post also strongly supports the second strongest branch narrative – in 
37 posts – ‘Only conservatists can help save EU and/ or Estonia’, since it clearly states 
‘if Estonia and Europe want to survive, they must pursue national conservative policies 
and resist pressure from the left and liberals’ (110). The explanation or description of the 
plan to how they would save EU or Estonia was rarely or never given, the focus was on 
opposing. 
The third branch narrative ‘Leaving EU or/ and not following its orders is good’ serves 
as rebellion encourager and was strongly supported by a leaf narrative ‘Estonia should 
stand with and look up to its Allied nation states – Hungary, Poland and US – rather than 
EU’ sending a message that EU does not help improve Estonia’s geopolitical security 
status. ‘ ‘They voted against Hungary in the European Parliament, ie. they supported a 
resolution that can impose sanctions on our Ally,’ said Jaak Madison, EKRE's envoy. 
‘Hungary is Estonia's friend and ally in NATO, Hungary has contributed more than a 
billion euros to protect its external borders, the external border of the European Union, 
which is also part of our security. /.../ According to Madison, Hungary has every right to 
decide on its reforms, whether the European left likes it or not. (122). 
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This branch narrative that rebelling against EU is good, was also somewhat contradictory 
and confusing mainly because this did not completely align with the branch narrative 
‘EKRE doesn’t want to leave EU but reduce its power over nation states’. At the same 
time EKRE applauded leaving and resisting EU, however the idea that EKRE wants 
Estonia to leave EU was ridiculed. One main topic was supporting Great Britain’s Brexit 
and saying it leads to freedom of the economy and nation state: „Jaak Madison: The 
British took a step closer to independence! /.../ This means that at the end of March, they 
will have total freedom to establish trade relations with both the United States and other 
major economies. (149), Another example portrays EU as the huge monster who wants 
to suppress nation states sovereignty and at the same time alluding that they are the 
fighters for this sovereignty as standing opposite to the elites: ‘The British lit a fuse, which 
can no longer be extinguished. The British have said their word. Freedom is the most 
precious asset and independence cannot be given to foreign bureaucrats, who would 
shave the beards of all European men the same and turn children into mere monsters.’ 
(19). This would lead to think EKRE wants Estonia to leave as well, however, only in one 
post it was sort of indicated that Estonia should consider leaving EU: ‘/…/ if Britain, 
which has now survived Brexit, sees that there is no economic benefit from being in the 
European Union, but the loss of symmetry is noticeable, they will leave the EU. ‘In 
principle, Estonia faces a similar choice. After 2020, we will see that the euro money that 
we have built roads for will disappear. ‘’(70). 
Many posts included contradictory narratives with trying to empower the will of the 
people and promising that conservatists take it over with their ‘steady hands’: ‘/…/ if the 
federalized EU turns Estonia into a European province, the people must decide to take 
part in it /…/ The result is the strengthening of conservative, anti-national and anti-
immigration forces in Europe, which are likely to take over the determination of the future 
after the European elections. (148) and at the same time ridiculing the idea of leaving 
EU: ‘‘Do you believe this self-invented nonsense, as if we were going to close theatres by 
the government, expel the Russians from the country and build walls around Estonia? 
Would we leave the European Union and NATO and join the CIS?’ (141) 
The branch narrative ‘Conservative minded have good and EU-minded bad qualities’ was 
supported by different assessments made towards the two opposing groups. For example, 
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a leaf narrative ‘EU-minded prefer immigrants to national people’ because are cold-
hearted was in a post that reported of eviction of 70-year old Swedish resident, who was 
allegedly evicted from home to make room for asylum seekers (3). ‘The possible victory 
of the leader of the national front Marine Le Pen in the French elections has alarmed all 
sorts of socialists, federalists, so-called conservatives, liberals that they are ready to give 
power to even Arab immigrants rather than to leading favorite in popular alternative 
polls Le Pen’ (47) – this shows preferring immigrants as well as urging people to trust 
alternative, rather than mainstream. 
Another branch narrative ‘Being pro EU means being pro Russia, the oppressor’ was 
supported by leaf narratives that left-wing people are Kremlin minded and therefor 
traitors and that West-minded people accuse conservatives of being Kremlin agents, but 
are actually that themselves: ‘Imagine: Martin Helme is either an idiot or a Putin agent! 
Unfortunately, Tsahkna relies on Raul Rebane and Eerik-Niiles Kross, who rely on their 
own political and propagandistic beliefs, to say all this. I have no doubt that all three are 
commissioned and all three are subject to the rule that the thieves themselves demand the 
loudest apprehension. (113) – this is a great example of discursive counterstrategies, 
backfiring the accusations, however, again without any real argumentation. The 
narratives under this branch, are best described with the as a tactic ‘best defence is verbal 
attack’.  
Branch narrative ‘If don’t support conservatists, bad things will happen’ had two main 
sub-narratives behind it that both played on peoples feeling of security – a primal need 
for human existence. Firstly, if one doesn’t support conservatives, immigration from the 
South will turn Estonia into euro province which is after that conquered by Russia and 
Estonians will go extinct: ‘In all likelihood, the further escalation of the situation (or the 
continuation of mass immigration) will mean a civil war situation in Western European 
countries, the current excesses are only a prelude. However, if Europe is weak and 
plagued by internal contradictions, the likelihood that our old familiar eastern neighbour 
will take advantage of the situation will increase significantly. If the green men act here, 
will the controversial United States now come to our aid with weapons? Or would it be 
more sensible for a country so far geographically and mentally to make a deal with the 
Russian ruler?’ (144), secondly, if don’t support conservatist, Estonians will go extinct: 
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‘‘This is how they want the share of Estonians to decrease, the nation-state to disappear 
and a European province to emerge,’ Helme resented.’ (96).  
Branch narrative ‘EU punishes the ones that don’t follow EU’s orders’ was supported by 
sub-narratives that EU uses not following the rule of law as an excuse to invade home 
affairs and that EU won’t sign the Brexit deal as punishment to Great Britain for leaving: 
‘Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán warned on Friday that Budapest could veto the 
European Union's next seven-year budget plan, which seeks to link funding to adherence 
to alleged democratic standards. The plan is seen as an attempt to limit the ‘reversal of 
the separation of powers, the rule of law and other democratic principles and values’ in 
countries such as Hungary and Poland, but in practice they are a punishment for 
disobedience to Brussels' orders. (94). 
The last branch narrative under this root is ‘The real and right EU people are white with 
conservative values’, they don’t want immigrants and are indigenous, this often briefly 
referred to Christian values: ‘If God wanted the whole world to be a mess of nations and 
races, He would not have created the world in such a way that white people in Europe 
and some darker people in Africa.’ (138).  
 
3.2. EU Wants Ultimate Power 
Two of the most occurred branch narratives in my research fell under the second root 
narrative ‘EU wants to have (ultimate) power over its member (nation) states’, which 
clearly demonstrates interlinking immigration and integration to the collective memories 
of ‘colonization’ under the Soviet Union and the collective anxieties of being oppressed 
again, as discovered by Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019). An example: ‘Friday marks 30 
years since the adoption of the Estonian Declaration of Sovereignty - unfortunately, 
Estonian sovereignty is under attack again. At the time, it was a protest against the Soviet 
empire, which arrived with fire and sword - the new empire in the form of the European 
Union is more insidious, it is infiltrating quietly, but it is already clear that it feels 
confident enough to threaten and demand. (134). 
The most occurred branch narrative according to my research was ‘EU wants to make 
one big EU nation (The United Nations of Europe) and demolish sovereign nation states’ 
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was supported in 61 news posts, an example: ‘Similarly, behind the current migration 
crisis, when we look at mass immigration as a whole, there are always liberal politicians 
and their supporters in the media and academia who dream of a world where we are all 
happy consumers in a warm bath of rainbow-colored multiculturalism.’ (8) 
demonstrating hatred towards liberal ideology and immigration, that the liberal-minded 
have brought along. The second strongest branch narrative ‘EU-minded people and 
establishments care for money and power, not people’ was supported in 55 news posts. 
The narrative of EU wanting to The United Nations of Europe was mostly supported by 
two narratives, that immigration policy is used to take away states’ sovereignty and that 
EU wants to kill traditional values. ‘Today, five years ago, the leaders of the Estonian, 
Latvian and Lithuanian nationalities met in Bauska, Latvia and signed the Bauska 
Declaration. It stated, among other things: ‘We reaffirm the primacy of the sovereignty 
of our peoples over supranational institutions and we oppose any attempt to include our 
independent nation states in the United States. We are following the immigration policies 
of Western European countries as a warning. Our demographic situation does not allow 
any new mass immigration into our countries. We regard the family and the homeland as 
core values, despite the emerging ideas of cultural Marxism, postmodernist 
multiculturalism and destructive liberalism. (119). Also, EU was referred to as a 
federation or wanting to become one.  
The narrative ‘EU-minded prefer immigrants to nationals’ from first root, also supports 
the branch narrative of EU wanting to make one big EU nation. ‘The national, 
immigration and labor market policies of the entire Estonian state seem to be increasingly 
aimed at one goal - to lose the nation state, push Estonians, their language and culture 
into the background or force them to emigrate, exchange indigenous people for 
immigrants and create a multicultural euro province.’ (98). EU was said to use its 
‘values’ like tolerance, solidarity and fake humanism in order to demolish nation states. 
The following example portrays EU as inhuman: ‘The ideology of ‘keeping up with the 
times’ is nothing more than surrendering to a revolution - a movement full of heresy or 
false teaching, which tries to uproot the human soul from its own body and forge a ‘new 
person’ in the course of globalization. All this is being done under the slogan of tolerance, 
solidarity and hypocritical false humanism, which is particularly irresponsible and 
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criminal because it exploits the trust of benevolent people. (124). This is also supported 
by sub-narrative that EU wants to Islamize nation states/ EU will Islamize.  
The branch narrative ‘EU-minded people and establishments care for money and power, 
not people’ is supported by narratives that EU legislation, values and money are 
instruments of political subordinance and power, EU-minded governments and 
establishments are corrupt, deep states and EU establishments don’t understand or care 
what people want. ‘For a long time now, it has seemed to anxious Estonians that the state 
makes everything possible for the sake of relative prosperity and this is reflected in the 
immoderate construction of large industries, highways and mines. I personally believe 
that EKRE voter has been made so thoughtful by the policies of governments facing 
Europe that is over-measuring nine times before cutting. Those who immediately go on a 
cheer with each project will see hefty euro rolls in every such object. (82). The example 
is clear-cut polarization of two groups that ends with ‘a pat on the back’ for EKRE’s 
supporters affirming they are on the right track.  
The branch narrative ‘EU has propagandistic nature’ is strongly supported by sub-
narratives that anything that’s mainstream, like media, is under the control of Brussels 
and is used to destroy conservatists and EU is the same as or worse than Soviet Union. 
The following is a snippet from the post made after Martin Helme gave an interview to a 
news outlet Deutsche Welle carried out by journalist Tim Sebastian: ‘Both Tim Sebastian 
and Postimees follow the narrative of the so-called lying populist and try to do everything 
to portray Martin Helme as a misleading populist politician. By manipulating the figures 
and distorting what is being said, they are trying to show that Helme is exaggerating (i.e. 
lying) /…/ Ideological workers who, because of their worldviews, are eager to expose a 
‘lying populist’ should not work in the press and should not call themselves journalists. 
Nor should the ideological output they produce be considered a press. (165). 
Also ‘EU wants to repress not EU-minded because is afraid of losing its supremacy’ is 
supported by that EU-minded people want to prohibit conservative’s freedom of speech 
and judge them, because they are not real democrats, but conservatists are, the left just 
does not understand it: ‘The main units of the Estonian media (Delfi, Reporter, etc.) have 
started accusing Estonians with a more conservative worldview of inciting foreign hatred 
and hate speech, racism, etc. Of course, there are emotionally charged comments and 
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sayings and the media often doesn't hold back on amplifying them. However, it is 
completely misleading to draw general conclusions about the Estonian people on this 
basis, because Estonians defend their sense of home, ie their rights as an indigenous 
people. /…/ repulsive and angry expressions about uneducated immigrants express more 
than racism based on narrow-mindedness and superiority. Thinking about what is behind 
people's fears and despair, it turns out that it is not just a person's primitive ego. (7). This 
is a pinpoint example of the racist discourse that the PRR call ‘right to identity’ serving 
as a rhetorical tool to counter charges of xenophobia, racism and extremism claiming to 
be and represent the ‘true’ democrats as described by Betz (2018: 152) and Betz and 
Johnson (2004: 311-312). 
 
3.3. EU-mindedness Is Dangerous 
The third root narrative ‘Being and supporting EU-minded is dangerous’ can be 
summarized with two main concepts – EU-minded people’s physical safety and wellbeing 
is at risk and also EU-minded people are victims of the ideology or religion of Europe. 
It’s well described in the following statement: ‘Ghettos with an Islamic population, no-
go zones, burning cars, gangs, violence, bombs, terrorism and the constant harassment 
of women / girls by immigrants, sexual crimes, mosques and the removal of crosses from 
churches. In Malmö, no more Christmas is allowed, only winter holidays. The crazy 
situation in mixed schools, the shortage of police and the exodus of indigenous peoples. 
The same violence has already been experienced by the Estonian people’ (150). This 
shows pressing on the safety of more ‘fragile’ society groups, as women and children and 
bringing in sexual violence, which could be the worst thing after death that a person can 
image happening to him or her. Playing on people’s fear is clear in this example, however 
completely fictional, since, Estonia was not ‘hit’ by the wave of immigrants. In addition, 
EU-minded establishments, including Estonia’s left-wing liberal establishment, decision-
making was blamed for this violence: The story again reaches the migration pact and 
migrants, to whom the Estonian authorities gave the green light. However, a harsh 
warning came across the Gulf about the long-term rape of young Finnish girls aged 10-
14 by a gang of migrants and this is no exception, but is already a ‘new norm’ in Finland. 
Estonian male politicians do not think about the safety of their daughters /…/ it happens 
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in masses, as the experience of Western Europe shows. Why don't Estonian politicians 
understand or see how globalization deprives our children of a peaceful life here in their 
own country? (139). Also: ‘We have to ask ourselves, are the young women living in 
Tallinn ready for ghettos that could be raped in our capital due to immigrants? Such a 
world is brought to us by the socialists' commitment to multicultural ideology. Elsewhere 
in Europe, socialists have proved that they are ready to sacrifice all their other favorite 
minorities - women, gays, minorities - on the altar of multiculturalism.’ (63).  
From the previous examples may be falsely concluded that when it comes to women, the 
discourse is always based on ‘protecting the more fragile gender’, on the contrary, women 
are portrayed according to how the situation needs – they claim childless women should 
not talk about the rights of the women, since only being a mother captures the existence 
of womanhood: ‘/…/ how is it possible to stand up for women's rights if a woman does 
not know what it means to be a mother? She is a representative of pretentious career 
women, not of the whole gentler sex! Childless women tend to shout the most about the 
right to abortion and the right not to have children at all, for which they should not be 
criticized (although it is the offspring that form the basis of our retirement) - and at the 
same time they tend to speak for all women. The same is true of the leader of the new 
project party [Kristina Kallas – K. K.], whose life fluctuates in the barren waters of 
globalism and Sorosity.’ (139) However, a woman with children can also be heavily 
criticised for her ‘womanly’ politics based on soft values, for example president Kersti 
Kaljulaid or counsellor Angela Merkel.  
One sub-narrative that supported this branch narrative, was that EU may try to gain power 
by using force – aggression and violence – for example with the help of the European 
Army: ‘‘The European Union's own army plan is very dangerous in many ways,’ explains 
Martin Helme /…/ There is also a danger that such an army could be used in the future 
against reluctant Member States who do not obey the Commission, for example in 
relocating immigrants. (34) and in contrast, taping on the strength of conservatists: ‘In 
addition, Gräzin said that Europe should never have an army, as it will certainly force 
the resistance movement in the Member States.’ (123). 
The second important branch narrative was ‘EU-mindedness is blind religion, ideology 
(Religion of Europe)’, which was mainly supported by that Estonian Government 
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worships and obeys Brussels due to which makes bad decisions and that EU-minded 
people are brainwashed, can’t think on their own, are afraid and have bad qualities: 
‘‘European countries must admit that they have imported millions of foreign cultures who 
are violently attacking Europe's indigenous peoples because of the distorted ideology of 
multiculturalism. (52) and ‘Multicult brainwashing in schools is in full swing, cinema 
propaganda has also been used. Since both the previous Reform Party-led government 
and the current Ratas government have apparently decided to replace the people with 
strangers in our beloved homeland, Estonia, on the ‘warm recommendation’ of Brussels, 
national conservatives cannot agree with such multicultural propaganda. /…/ It is 
especially disgusting when this is done by the so-called tear-pulling method of arousing 
compassion.’ (38). 
People were often denigrated and labeled EU-minded simply for disagreeing with EKRE, 
which shows again the attempt to polarize people into two opposing groups, as simply as 
saying that the conservative minded are wise and leftist are slow-minded liers. For 
example: ‘It is strange that an educated (or rather pointless in education?) White 
European no longer understands basic things. Prosperity, consumer insanity, amenities, 
teen-oriented television, buzzing media, aggressive propaganda of violence and sex, 
pornography and computer games, declaring perversions normal, lying and greedy 
politicians, destroying the natural environment. A terrible list, of course, a person who 
has lived in such a greenhouse can no longer really, naturally think, he can only see the 
world through a narrow slit. Or through dirty greenhouse glasses. A wise man can 
recognize the rays of wisdom from the great darkness… But a fool, wise man does not 
listen. He argues. With demagoguery. What else does he have to offer against wisdom?’ 
(5). Also, journalists are called child journalists (150) and snowflakes (150) and again 
that elite is worried because of the powerful doings of conservatists: ‘Raul Rebane, a 
former sports commentator, has now been thrown out against national conservatives, and 
he usually shows up when cartel politicians situation gets sour’ (145). The narrative that 
EU-minded people have bad qualities somewhat overlapped with the narrative from the 
first root’s ‘Being against EU and EU-minded will save EU and nation states’ branch 




The branch narrative ‘If don’t support conservatists, Estonia’s sovereignty and its 
people’s freedom is at cost’ largely overlapped with the branch narrative ‘If don’t support 
conservatives, bad thing will happen’ under the first root narrative. It included sub-
narratives that if one does not support conservatists, immigration from the South will turn 
Estonia into euro province which is then conquered by Russians and Estonians will go 
extinct. However, the sub-narrative of EU-minded people preferring immigrants to 
nationals also supported this branch narrative, which supported the branch narrative of 
‘Conservative minded have good and EU-minded bad qualities’ under the first root 
narrative.  
The branch narrative ‘due to following EU, Estonia can’t be friends with its important 
Visegrad Allies or US, who would help Estonia when its independency is at stake’ was 
supported by one main sub-narrative, which was that Estonia should stand with and look 
up to its real Allies – Hungary, Poland and US – rather than EU. ‘Estonia's path runs in 
the same direction as Poland, a straight-backed ally, not against it. /…/ Estonia cannot 
afford that the Poles, seeing our backstroke at a time when they needed help, will never 
turn their backs on us. All the more so as in the event of any conflict with Russia, Poland, 
which comes into contact with Lithuania and the Kaliningrad enclave of Russia, will 
certainly be immediately involved in the war and will be able to help us most quickly.’ 
(92) and ‘/…/ we do not support a federal Europe, but the Visegrad Quartet and their 
allies /…/’ (80). Much effort is put to saying that the Visegrad countries, especially 
Hungary, has real democracy that EU wants to suppress, for example: ‘Martin Helme 
pointed out that the Estonian mainstream media tried to talk less about the whole 
Hungarian story, because it is not really a matter of Hungarian democracy, but of its 
absence in the EU - the European Union is demolishing social institutions within itself.’ 
(123). This can be interpreted that EKRE appraises the countries where PRR have reached 
power as examples to Estonia. 
 
3.4. The EU as an Organisation Does Not Work 
The root narrative ‘EU as an organization does not work’ had three strong branch-
narratives. The first ‘EU is no longer democratic’ was supported by that immigration 
policy is forced and undemocratic and did not include the will of the people with the 
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endeavor for direct democracy: ‘‘With the support of these signatures, we demand a 
referendum where people can express their opinion on whether they agree with our 
country's participation in the European Union's refugee resettlement program,’ said 
Martin Helme, /…/ The Estonian people must also have the right to decide how much we 
accept immigrants.’ According to Helme, one of the goals of the Conservative People's 
Party is to introduce a people's initiative and other mechanisms of direct democracy in 
Estonia.’ (15). Also, that fundamental freedoms are no longer free, for example freedom 
of speech is now racism or hate speech and complimenting or enjoying beauty of women 
is now sexism. ‘The so-called ‘European values’, especially extreme feminism and 
gender neutrality, also make matters worse. Let only a few ‘white middle-aged men’ try 
to smile at some of the amazons who took part in the ‘women's march’ - this ‘pervert’ and 
‘chauvinist’ are immediately striped for sexual harassment!’ (159) and ‘‘If we 
recommend that the currently developed Europe start fighting ethnic migration, it will 
certainly be hit by an avalanche of accusations of inhumanity, racism, xenophobia and 
many other sins.’’ (93), also ‘An ideology that formally protects the rights of ‘minorities’ 
but actually deprives society of freedom of expression and punishes victims instead of 
criminals can be boldly called liberal fascism.’’ (31). 
Secondly, that ‘EU isn’t an honourable or honest organization’ was mainly described by 
sub-narratives that stress the bad qualities of EU – being bureaucratic, lying, weak, 
cowardly and so on. ‘Liberal Europe will not fight, it will not be able to execute its mass 
murderers through the death penalty, but it will now turn its butt in front to make it easier 
for strangers to beat and throat to make it easier to cut through.’ (93) 
Thirdly, ‘EU’s politics are bad for member states or member states’ economy’ was 
supported by narratives about EU politics, for example, economic and agriculture politics 
are not reasonable. This is an example of how EU is to blame for extinction of Estonian 
rural life in Kallaste: ‘Previously, the town had its own high school and vocational high 
school, where mechanics, electricians and salesmen were trained. Today, only the 9th 
grade school remains. About a dozen previously operating industrial companies have 
also been liquidated. Fishing and selling fish has been made almost impossible for the 
locals. The traditional onion and cucumber cultivation along Lake Peipsi has also 
become obsolete due to the European Union's policy of destroying local agriculture.’ 
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(26). The least prominent second-level narrative criticises EU’s economical politics, 
showing some argumentation behind the narrative.  
 
3.5. Immigration Policy Breaks Up the EU 
The fifth root narrative ‘Immigration policy consequences break up EU’ was used both 
ways, as the policy will break up EU or has already done it. The main branch narrative is 
‘EU does not realize the bad that comes with immigration and helping developing 
countries’ which was supported by narratives, that immigration brings violence and 
terrorism – which also supported the narrative under the third root, that being EU-minded 
is dangerous – and that EU isn’t able to control immigration flow and terrorism flow into 
EU. Also, that EU funds terrorism without knowing it. The branch narrative ‘EU doesn’t 
see that immigrants have their own agenda’ was supported by narratives, that immigrants 
do not want to/ will not integrate, but to take over EU, Immigrants aren’t really refugees, 
but come here for good economy and they think badly of EU’s culture and values. ‘It is 
no longer a secret that this ‘escape’ across the Mediterranean is big and dirty business. 
In the process, those killed have either been confused or have had to take into account 
that the criminal affair may have a sad ending for them. And they paid for it themselves. 
/…/ Human traffickers take them aboard the coast of North Africa and force them into 
random pilots in international waters. All in order for European ships, including the 
foundations of voluntary associations, to be ‘legally’ picked up. In essence, these 'blue-
eyed associations' are, in fact, involved in international crime, as Laura Huhtasaari, the 
indigenous Finn's representative in the European Parliament, has just said. Please note: 
most ‘refugees’ are full-blooded, young men at their best. But those who drown are more 
women and children, because those ‘men’ save themselves first, not the poorer fellow 
travelers.’ (206) 
The last branch narrative was ‘Immigrants will not integrate, so EU’s plan to make a big 
EU nation won’t work’ which was supported by that immigrants don’t want to/ won’t 
integrate, but to take over EU and Negros and Muslims will get out of hand: ‘An intolerant 
and militant religion has established itself in the Old World and when it grows up, it 
begins to make its demands and pay for itself. This is a time when Islam is no longer 
subject to the rules of democracy. By eating, however, appetite grows and a democratic 
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society already abandons its principles because it fears violence by strangers when it 
comes to creating order. But it will not save him, because strangers despise the enemies 





















4. Analysis of the Findings 
My research results confirm, as Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) claimed, that 
the main four themes of EKRE – anti-Russian stance, Euroscepticism, family values and 
refugees – are often blended together. The narratives that were established were infested 
with conspiracy theories, including ‘The New World Order’ (Madisson, 2016). For 
example, the second biggest root narrative as conspiracy ‘EU wants to have (ultimate) 
power over its member (nation) states’ was supported by branch narrative ‘EU wants to 
Islamize nation states’, where conspiracies on EU’s bad intentions were constructed 
through Euroscepticism and migration. A branch narrative that being pro EU means being 
pro Russia, the oppressor, which was supported by leaf narrative that EU-minded people 
are Kremlin minded, demonstrates using anti-Russian stance and Eurosceptic themes to 
support the conspiracies. 
The results of my research affirm EKRE’s three-dimensional Euroscepticism – 
geopolitical, sociocultural and economic, with the latter least important (Braghiroli and 
Petsinis; 2019: 6). Therefore, financial crisis, as reluctance to help the countries that 
suffered from the European debt crisis, as claimed to be the third most important topic in 
EKRE’s EU critical narratives, next to anti-elitism and migration by Kasekamp, 
Madisson and Wierenga (2018: 49-52), no longer dominates. Economic problems were 
rather seen through unfairness of EU politics, for example unjust agriculture development 
funding. EKRE continuously opposes EU’s immigration policy and can be still seen as 
Eurosceptic party that is driven by xenophobic nationalism (Petsinis, 2019: 225; 
Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018; Braghiroli and Petsinis: 2019; Makarychev 
and Sazono, 2019; Wierenga, 2017; Wierenga, 2019).  
To answer the first research question, ‘How the European Union is constructed in the 
alternative media channel of Estonian PRR Uued Uudised?’, it is mainly constructed 
through agitation and polarization. EKRE puts much effort on furthering of the right 
people from wrong, as simply as ‘Conservative minded have good and EU-minded bad 
qualities’. Often rhetorical tools, common in PRR discourse, were used. In most 
narratives, fear and playing on people’s security, dominated heavily, calling the EU-
minded people are brainwashed victims of the religion of Europe, EU-minded people are 
secret agents for Putin, with saying that anything mainstream from journalism and 
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establishments to education and liberal values are the propaganda of Brussels trying to 
turn EU member states into United Nations of Europe, as a ‘grey mass’ that is easier to 
control, which was to be achieved by Islamizing EU. EU itself was said to use to be 
democratic, but not anymore.  
Power and money were said to be the main drivers of EU-minded people for why they try 
to destroy the nation states. EU-minded people, based on the empirical findings, were 
portrayed as blind followers of the values that are set out in the Treaty of European Union 
(2012) paragraph two – respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule 
of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities. However, in a much more negative way – which is common for PRR parties 
(Greven’s, 2016: 1) – in a sense that they prefer ‘Europeanness’ to ‘Estonianness’ and 
turn the EU’s integration to dangerous course, both physically and culturally. EU-minded 
person approves immigration policy and the demolition of nation states while preferring 
immigrants to national people. They want to abolish national values and culture, are 
brainwashed by the leaders of EU, while also secretly agents for Kremlin. Especially 
important is, that EU-minded people do not really care about the indigenous people. EU-
minded people oppose Conservatists and want to suppress them in any way possible, such 
as using mainstream media as tool for propaganda and taking away their freedom of 
speech. They are traitors with bad human qualities, for example are dumb, naïve, cruel, 
coldhearted and even hate children.  
Inversely, conservatives were portrayed as the saviors, who EU-minded people try to 
oppress through every possible way – denying them common freedoms, as freedom of 
speech, lying about them, using the liberal values, like tolerance and equality, in order to 
muzzle the conservatists, the rebels not following EU were punished with the help of EU 
legislation, as was the case for Hungary or Poland, were EU interfered in domestic affairs. 
However, conservatist were portrayed as the beacon of light that can turn the EU on the 
right course and a worthy opponent that the left-wing is much afraid of.  
My results confirm, as Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019: 6) claimed that EKRE’s 
Euroscepticism is tightly bound with identity politics, since EKRE sees Estonia as a 
victim of both EU liberalism and Russian imperialism, portraying EU as ‘the other’ in its 
discourse (Makarychev and Sazonov, 2019: 462-463). The socio-psychological strategy 
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of victimising Estonians and portraying EU and the forced immigration policies as the 
new oppressors who try rob Estonia from its sovereignty (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019; 
Petsinis, 2019; Trumm: 2018: 341), is still very strongly present in EKRE’s EU 
narratives. EU, EU-minded people and establishments were described as unjust 
forbidders the long longed-for freedom. 
The second research question was ‘How xenophobic nationalism is used in EU 
narratives in the alternative media channel of Estonian PRR Uued Uudised?’. In 
EKRE’s discourse ‘us’ represents the pure, conservative, common, often with rural roots 
nationalist Estonians and ‘them’ the people and minorities that EU-minded liberal people 
approve of, like immigrants and other national minorities, Russians, Ukrainians, also 
sexual minorities, like LGBQT people, feminists and other that contradict with 
conservative values. 
The ‘right to identity’ served as a justification for xenophobia, racism and extremism 
(Betz, 2018: 152) perceiving the racist discourse as a normal one often using 
counterattacks as a tool. Mart Helme stated in Uued Uudised news post, that not EKRE, 
but left radicals are to blame for turning Estonian society angry and intolerant: ‘You are 
the ones who, with your ideological stamps, automatically attach forehead labels to those 
who disagree – racist, Nazi, fascist, Putinist, xenophobic, hater, extreme nationalist, far 
right.’ (141). In another news post one of the regular writers Malle Pärn states the same 
adding that ‘EKRE tries to protect the people from you. Fear and evil are sown by the 
attacker, not the defender.’ (138). Strategically and tactically using negativity Greven’s 
(2016: 1) – disrespects, personal insults, violent metaphors, refusal of compromise and 
demand for radical solutions – characterized the discourse on EU.  
At the same time emotion and resentment, as Betz (2018: 143) argued, played important 
role in political mobilisation. Pressing on the painful sentiment of the past and justifying 
it with angrily protecting the newly achieved independence and sovereignty with strong 
emotions, claiming to fight for, what is the rightfully ‘ours’: ‘How does it surprise anyone 
that Estonians are not in favour of the migration agreement? Let's look at our history. 
Constant subjugation, killing and tax collection has been going on here. Imagine life a 
few hundred years ago at the end of November: sitting in a smoky shack in the light of a 
torch, spinning the yarn, family having fun, telling fairy tales and parables. From time to 
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time, someone goes to the manor to work and/or get beaten. And then there's a war /…/’ 
(125).  
Nationalism, identity politics and imaginaries from nationalist past (Wodak, 2015: 2) 
were tightly knitted into the EU narratives, again through opposition, for example a 
narrative ‘EU wants to kill traditional values, like family, culture and Christian values. 
However, these were rarely expounded. Christian values were often mentioned, but what 
was meant by Christian values, was hardly explained. The same goes for integrating 
nativist ideas into today’s society. Often were mentioned the simplicity of rural times and 
appraised the sobriety of peasant thinking, but how this would fit into nowadays society 
and politics, left much empty space for interpretation.  
The authoritarian approach, fighting for direct democracy and praising the rural common 
people as the hard-working ‘real’ Estonians that the strong leader Mart Helme vows to 
represent, might draw similarities to much resent times under the oppression of Soviet 
Union. However, in Uued Uudised, this was not the case. It is only possible to conclude, 
that this could be due to the unknown, but perhaps small number of the same people that 
write the posts in Uued Uudised and therefor keep producing the ‘same’ stories. Whereas 
in mainstream media, every politician speaks for themselves, as was the case with Arvo 
Allers suggestion to send the children to work on the fields, therefor saying things 
EKRE’s leadership might not approve of, reflecting the different understanding of which 
nationalist past is being tried to create.  
Although the ideal EU of nation states with more sovereignty, was mentioned often, no 
solid description – which policies should be more sovereign and how it would work, in 
which areas or establishment there should be direct democracy, what should the specifics 
of this kind of establishment be – was provided. The idea of Intermarium, as Kasekamp, 
Madisson and Wierenga (2018) said, was clearly present in EU narratives, however, again 
on a rather abstract level. For example branch narrative ‘Due to following EU, Estonia 
can’t be friends with its important Visegrad Allies or US, who would help Estonia when 
its independency is at stake’ was supported by a leaf narrative ‘Estonia should stand with 
and look up to its real Allies – Hungary, Poland and US – rather than EU’. EKRE 
appraises the countries where PRR have reached power. The vision of a union of nation 
states was present, but represented through opposition, focusing on EU’s obstructive role.  
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All five root narratives can be seen as carriers of PRR nativist appeals, where EU is 
described as the enemy counteracting to Estonia’s endeavour towards sovereignty. 
However, PRR rhetorical ‘tools’ always accompanied the statements and claims therefor 
becoming a part of the narratives. The PRR rhetoric, especially the rhetoric that is used 
to fuel the ideas and narratives of xenophobic nationalism, have tremendous role and 
importance in regard to portraying EU and EU related topics. It is important to note that 
Estonia was not hit with waves of immigration, through which in the news posts was 
portrayed the possible doom of sovereignty of nationalist Estonia. Racism, ethnocentrism, 
xenophobia, nativism, religiocentrism and heterophobia (Minkenberg (2017) and 
Heitmeyer (2005, through Minkenberg, 2017: 15) are all wrapped into the Eurosceptic 
narratives in order to show the importance of distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘them’ as the 
scapegoated minority, that manifests as a phenomenon of ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak, 2015) 
Playing on people’s fears and sense of security appeared in all the root and branch 
narratives. The third root narrative ‘Being and supporting EU-minded is dangerous’, 
which itself is already fear provoking, was supported in half of the encoded posts. The 
fear occurred in narratives as: 
• fear for one’s safety or one’s family, since immigrants bring violence and terrorism, 
worries about women’s safety because they will be the victims of sexual violence; 
• the fear of losing Estonia’s sovereignty after Russian aggression, which was said to 
follow after EU-minded turn Estonia into euro province; 
• the fear of losing fundamental freedoms, like freedom of speech, since EU-minded 
suppress not conservative-minded people’s freedoms; 
• fear of replacing values, like family values, as marriage between man and wife and 
the importance of children, but also Christian values with feminism, liberal LGBQT 
and violent Islamic values; 
• fear of losing ‘Estonianness’ since EU wants to make one big EU nation, which if 
necessary, is filled with immigrants, since they might prefer them to indigenous 
people, also fear for the future, since Estonians might go extinct with current EU 
policies; 
• and over all fear and anger towards ‘the other’ – EU-minded people, who are to 
blame for everything that’s bad in today’s society starting from violence that the 
75 
 
immigration policy brings, to brainwashing children in school without questioning 
the ‘Blind religion of Europe’ and also who are actively trying to make conservatives 
lives miserable. 
Therefore, I propose a theory that EKRE regularly uses specific EU narratives for 
scapegoating the EU in order to maintain power through the support of the ‘pure’ group 
and keeping the society polarized by using the PRR rhetoric, blame and fear. EKRE 
pictures EU are as a scapegoat firstly for keeping Estonia from sovereign decision making 
and secondly for immigration and integration that obliterates nationalism. Their usage of 
conspiracy theories, playing of people’s fear, attribution of blame and other discursive 
strategies and elements, like verbal attacking, racism, sexism and heterophobia, often 
presented through factually incorrect information they claim as truth, as simple as EU 
wants to destroy ‘Estonianness’, when in fact EU has allocated hundreds of millions of 
euros to help better the rural and social life, which directly effects the wellbeing of large 
amount of EKRE supporters. 
Posts in Uued Uudised often had a certain structure, where at the beginning a general idea 
would be stated, for example, ‘EKRE has been drawing attention to Estonia's neo-
Russification for some time, but it must also be seen in the context of European 
federalization.’ (125). This statement was followed by tension building focusing on all 
the bad things that left-liberal people and the EU are doing and how indigenous people 
are suppressed, ‘The globalist Estonian cartel society uses Russification to destroy the 
nation state and turn Estonia into a European province. /…/ Here, however, globalist-
minded people lose their sense of reality because they hope to control these processes, 
but because the plans involve uncontrollable forces (the Putinist part of the Russian 
community in Estonia, Muslims in Western Europe), things can soon get out of control.’ 
(125). And at the end of the post EKRE comes out with a soothing message, that the world 
order could be saved and everybody safe, but only when choosing EKRE, ‘Left-wing 
liberals therefore want to destroy such societies by encoding in them conflicts arising 
from multiculturalism - in order to gain control of them by force. In Estonia, such 
processes will come to an unfortunate end as soon as EKRE comes to power’ (125). It is 
common for communities that act in echo chambers to embed already existing beliefs 
through repetition (Grömping, 2014; Törnberg, 2018). 
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PRR rhetoric of discursive strategies for implementing victim-attacker roles, 
stigmatization, confrontation and construction of conspiracy theories, as well as playing 
on people’s fears and feeling on security scapegoating immigrants, but also the socio-
psychological strategy that helps to mobilize through fear of re-colonization that PRR use 
to achieve their goals, are crucially important to consider in EKRE’s discourse. News 
posts with certain structures appearing regularly, shows regular usage of fear as tool of 
manipulation for keeping their supporters ‘inflamed’. As no thorough factual 
explanations, as stated in theory, appeared for most of the narratives or even statements. 
For example, how or why EU-minded people are Kremlin agents, only was said that they 
have bad qualities, they want to demolish nation states and that they care for power or 
money. Some argumentation was found regarding EU policies that supported the branch 
narratives that EU is no longer democratic, and its policies are bad for member states and 
their economies. The strongest leaf narrative here was that immigration and integration 
policy are not democratic but forced. Also, economic politics of EU were criticized in 
eight posts. However, all this often did not appear together in one post. Rather every post 
had a spec of some narrative(s), so these fragments came together as a whole narrative – 
making the argumentation given by EKRE insufficient.  
This shows that the xenophobic nativist appeals that mobilize people with the help of 
PRR rhetorical tricks, are the drivers in EKRE’s EU critical discourse. Moreover, the 
Echo chamber (Grömping, 2014; Törnberg, 2018) theory, of repetition of the same 
information in closed community, helped to assure the already existing narratives. The 
era of post-truth and vernacular authority (Madisson and Ventsel, 2017) only strengthens 
the opportunities for spreading alternative information and for people to believe it. The 
element of authoritarianism was seen in news posts where Mart Helme was quoted, or 
where he was the author – in most posts the authors were not added – included the most 
and strongest narratives and statements. For example, a news post where Helme 
commented a terrorist act that had happened in London and how it means a radical change 
in politics is needed towards conservatism and immigration policy, included statements 
that supported 15 narratives, including leaf, branch and root narratives, which shows the 
importance of authoritarianism through the charismatic strong father-figure leader, that 
often for PRR parties determinates the course of the party. Keeping their electorate incited 
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and at the same time vowing to keep them secure serves as an effective rhetorical 
approach in EKRE’s EU narratives.  
 
4.1. Contradictions in EU Narratives 
EKRE’s media discourse is guided simultaneously by some norms of dominant political 
communication as well as by the provocative and controversial argumentation patterns of 
radical-right grass-roots social media (Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 2018). The 
main contradictions in the narratives were about the EU and EU-minded people and 
defence. There was little inconsistency, since they were named both dumb victims of the 
EU religion who take everything that comes from Brussels over without questioning 
because are spineless. At the same time, the EU-minded had great plans of demolishing 
nation states and spread EU propaganda for money and were secret agents for Putin, 
which would make the reader interpret that they need to be quite clever. The same 
inconsistency applied for statements and narratives about EU. The EU was a victim of 
immigration, violence and Islamization, because wanted to help refugees due to soft 
values, like tolerance solidarity and humanism. Simultaneously, EU planned the 
Islamization to gain power over nation states and used immigration policy for it, 
moreover, not following EU’s orders could be punished by EU interfering member state’s 
home affairs, for example Hungary or Poland.  
Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) claim, that Europe is not as big of an enemy 
of EKRE as Russia. Even though this thesis did not focus on the party’s Russian narratives 
or attitudes, the Soviet Union was regularly compared to EU as more pleasant and normal 
union than the EU. In the summer of 2019 Mart Helme gave an exclusive interview to 
Baltnews, which is propagandistic channel under the control of Putin, where according to 
Baltnews, he said there is no threat to Estonia from Russia (Eesti minister teeb…, 2019). 
Keeping in mind Mart Helme has served as a diplomat in Russia and therefore is aware 
of the consequences to giving an interview to a propagandistic media channel under the 
control of Putin. Moreover, EKRE politicians have agreed that their EU narratives are 
similar to Russia’s EU approach (Wierenga, 2017). Based on the results of this thesis, in 
one post EKRE agreed that the narratives about collapsing Europe go in line with Russian 
Federation narratives about collapsing West. ‘Maybe Russia really uses the same 
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statements as EKRE, but that does not belittle the fact that Europe is in trouble with mass 
immigration /…/’ (145). EKRE’s stance on Russia needs further research. 
EKRE politicians strongly oppose to the ideology of Putin denying any intentional 
similarities in narratives (Wierenga, 2017). Mudde (2016b) says that while the 
connections between the European far right and Russia deserve serious scrutiny, rather 
than wild speculation, they are not Putin’s real Trojan Horse within the EU, rather they 
include former prime ministers of major EU countries, like Silvio Berlusconi, Tony Blair 
and Gerhard Schroeder, who still hold serious economic and political cloud and, most of 
all, they include political leaders like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who is 
worth more to Putin than all far right parties together. Hungary is named as one of the 
main real Allies of Estonia in Uued Uudised, that has real democracy. 35 
Another unclarity appeared around defence cooperation in EU. In an earlier post a 
statement was made that EU should engage in developing defence cooperation inside EU, 
however later posts included statements that collective defence in EU should not be 
developed. The number of posts discussing this was rather marginal. However, EKRE 
expressed clearly that the real Allies are Hungary, Poland and US. This made up a branch 
narrative ‘Due to following EU, Estonia can’t be friend with its important Visegrad 
countries Allies or US, who would help Estonia when its independency is at stake’. This 
characterizes claim made by Braghiroli and Petsinis (2019: 7), EKRE does not count 
much on EU for securing the geopolitical situation of Estonia.  
Although EKRE is placed in the middle stage of Euroscepticism, not completely 
adversary nor completely on board, the subject of leaving or staying in EU was also quite 
‘obscure’. One of the branch narratives was that EKRE does not want to leave EU, but 
reduce its power over nation states, which was supported by statements in 25 news posts. 
 
35 One of the reasons why EKRE strongly looks up to its Hungary, is Hungary’s response to immigration 
politics, more especially border control. Other radical and extremist right-wing parties also decided to ‘join 
their forces’, because of the same matter. For example, the Danish People’s Party said they would never 
join a group with Le Pen because of her father’s Anti-Semitist attitudes, however securing Europe’s borders 
was the most important goal. And the Identity and Democracy far-right political group of the European 
Parliament, which includes nationalist, populist and Eurosceptic national parties from ten European nations, 
was formed, that EKRE also joined. 
79 
 
However, the leaf narratives that leaving EU leads to freedom of nation state and will do 
good to economy were presented in 18 posts. Mainly the examples were Great Britain’s 
Brexit and Hungary opposition to immigration policy. Wierenga (2017) concluded from 
the interviews with key EKRE members, that although EU is one of the most 
undemocratic systems, citing penalties for not accepting EU mandates and rules, the party 
had ever said that they wished to leave the EU, though they did applaud Brexit. From this 
could be concluded that appraisal for Great Britan’s leaving, which was said leads to 
freedom, was more of a way to express rebellion against EU, rather than a consideration 

















5. Discussion and Conclusions 
Populist radical right parties are characterized by three main features: nativism, 
authoritarianism and populism (Mudde, 2016a; Mudde, 2016b). While the populist 
ideology has much deeper roots in the US than in (Western) Europe, key elements are 
clearly linked to fundamental values of Western societies in general. Populists argue that 
the common sense of the people should always take precedence (Mudde, 2016b) and 
critizise the EU from a predominantly sovereignty-based perspective (Vasilopoulou, 
2018: 1). EKRE sees Estonia as a victim of both EU liberalism and Russian imperialism, 
portraying EU as ‘the other’ in its discourse (Makarychev and Sazonov, 2019: 462-463). 
The party gained popularity in Estonia by opposing EU’s immigration policy and ensured 
it with xenophobic nationalism (Petsinis, 2019: 225; Kasekamp, Madisson and Wierenga, 
2018; Braghiroli and Petsinis: 2019; Makarychev and Sazono, 2019; Wierenga, 2017; 
Wierenga, 2019). Fear that drives the EU narrative, as it pertains to the EU, makes the 
nature of EKRE’s discourse different from countries, as Germany, Hungary or Sweden, 
because  one is dealing with a potential and the other with a reality.  
My research set out to show how the EU was constructed in the alternative media channel 
of Estonian PRR party EKRE’s blog-like alternative news site Uued Uudised, where 
articles are written by EKRE for their members and supporters, therefore need not to try 
to convince new, possibly different-minded people who might disagree with them, but 
rather keep their followers with spreading certain information in an applicable manner. 
This makes Uued Uudised the purest source and grounded theory the most accurate 
method for my small-n research. I carried out two rounds of coding to identify and collect 
claims, statements and assumptions made about EU and EU related topics with the coding 
scheme concept named ‘Narrative tree’ (Appendix 1; Figure 3.2.), which consisted of 
three levels of narratives – root, branch and leaf – that all emerge from each other. My 
contribution to the study of EKRE through EU narratives, as well as the study of right-
wing party family overall, lies in the final concept through which the meaning making 
evolved. The coding scheme ‘Narrative tree’ reveals a deeper meaning by providing an 
analysis behind the colourful words and assessments and unorthodox style of discourse. 
The narratives are rather simple. On the larger root level, the focus is on rough 
polarization, worded simply as ‘Being and supporting EU-minded is dangerous’ or ‘EU 
wants to have (ultimate) power over its member (nation) states’. The branch level goes a 
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little more into detail, for example ‘EU member states’ people are in physical danger due 
to EU-minded establishments decision-making’. The leaf level shows the most specific 
and detailed narratives and therefore are the most closely worded to original statements. 
For example, ‘Gays, women and children are sacrificed for Islamizing Europe’. This 
allows to see, based on the specifics of my research, a three-layered approach as a rhetoric 
through which EKRE mobilizes their electorate.  
I used grounded theory as methodology for a content analysis to generate narratives based 
on empirical data in which knowledge evolves and expands with each new step. The 
weakness of the chosen method and methodology can be seen in that it is a single case 
study, so its ability to generalize is severely limited. Additionally, this is a single case 
study of a small country that has one of the smallest economies and populations in the 
European Union. Also, my study focuses on the discourse presented by EKRE, which 
means the narratives that were established through empirical analysis, may not be 
applicable to EKRE’s supporters – this would require further research. Despite this list of 
potential drawbacks, current thesis does address key issue – a single case study such as 
this helps prove that even in an open and relatively successful economy, a far-right party 
can still emerge and pray on cultural and societal fears.  
The biggest narratives that occurred in the news posts, were ‘Being against EU and EU-
minded will save EU and nation states’, ‘EU wants to have (ultimate) power over its 
member (nation) states’, ‘Being and supporting EU-minded is dangerous’, ‘EU as an 
organization does not work’ and ‘Immigration policy consequences break up EU’. My 
research shows that fear, in particular, was used as a driving concept throughout the 
narratives. Moreover, news posts with certain structures that played on peoples feeling of 
security and where only EKRE was said to be the one that can make the situation turn 
around, appeared regularly, which shows using fear – of immigrants, violence, 
sovereignty of the country, losing ‘Estonianness’ – as well as other PRR rhetorical 
strategies as manipulative tools. Based on my research I propose, that EKRE extensively 
uses specific EU narratives for scapegoating the EU through real and imagined fears and 
deepening the polarization in order to maintain their electorate. PRR rhetoric serves as a 
useful ‘toolbox’ of strategies for embedding these narratives. EU serves as an important 
actor as an enemy, through which the ‘rebellion’ is kept alive.  
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According to Mudde (2016b: 78) there is a crucial need for an open debate on EU’s future 
including the return to a less integrated EU. However populist rhetoric and unwillingness 
to compromise hinders this efficient debate from happening (Greven, 2016). Mudde 
(2016b: 130-133) argues that all political minorities, should be allowed to voice their 
opinions unconditionally because that way democracy functions best, however actually 
changing EU to be a union of nation states would probably be very difficult to do inside 
the current European Union, because it means going after the core values of this Unions 
being, for example liberalisation brought in with Maastricht treaty. Mudde’s argument 
makes sense from the democratic perspective, however, I doubt that freedom of speech 
serves as an efficient tool to tackle the polarization of two sides to bring back meaningful 
argumentation. PRR often dominate even in media sphere, due to the abundance of 
newsworthiness values. Emerging from my thesis, for, at least Uued Uudised, there is no 
intention for a dialogue – although they claim that the mainstream media does not publish 
their opinions and statements, they show no willingness for cooperation either. ‘Lighting 
the fuse’ is one strategy which the RR uses (Pytlas and Kossack, 2015) which does not 
necessarily mean that they want to be understood by the other side but cement their 
discourse in the political spectrum.  
Mudde (2016b) claims, that the PRR ideas constitute a radicalization of mainstream ideas 
and whether they are liked, need to be seen as new normalcy. While in some cases populist 
agenda is taken over by non-populist party, for example Social Democrats in Demark or 
Austrian People's Party, then sometimes the anti-establishment rhetoric can be down 
toned. The PRR party of Latvia, National Alliance slowly, but steadily, watered down its 
anti-establishment rhetoric and progressively down-toned its degree of Euroscepticism in 
order to adapt to this new centrality in the Latvian party system (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 
2019: 15), this does not appear to be the case for EKRE, at least not in its ‘news’ platform 
Uued Uudised. EKRE, despite its virtual nature often representing a shortcut to address 
complex issues such as multiculturalism, postmodernism, terrorism and national identity, 
has very vividly affected the political dynamics since 2015 (Braghiroli and Petsinis, 2019: 
16). 
Bornschier (2018) claims that the ‘losers’ of modernization are running a 
counterrevolution against the current leftist establishments. These are the people caught 
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in between the gears of change. Joining the EU in 2004 turned Estonia’s course toward 
integration inside EU. Over 35% of people had voted against joining, who were later in 
some ways left behind, since EU legislations basis is an ever-closer union. The rebellion, 
based on selective truths driven by ideology, is the keyword to describe EKRE’s EU 
discourse. The inability to go along with globalization and the long ignorance of the 
Eurosceptics, Madissons (2016: 192-195) explanation on how New World Order 
conspiracy allows to explain how extreme rightists empower themselves through 
translating their feelings of intolerance, fear, anger and moral superiority to a handy 
rhetorical tool as a conspiracy about dreadful acts of political elite whose goal is to create 
global centralized regime, in order to undermine and ridicule PRR sacred values and 
markers, like race, national sovereignty, nativism, Christian values, moral, traditional 
family values and gender roles.  
The exaggerations and twisting the truth do not able to see them as first-choice partners 
by other mainstream parties. The cleavage that Kriesi et al. (2006: 926) predicted the 
basic structure of the national political space will transform and the political parties will 
strategically reposition, has happened.  
Populist politics disregard for longer-term consequences (Guiso et al, 2018). For now, 
EKRE’s imagination of less integrated EU is a somewhat unrealistic ideology. To move 
forward towards less integrated Europe all aspects of realities need to be taken into 
consideration, which based on my research on EU narratives in Uued Uudised, is not 
done. For example, where should people with multicultural families belong and what 
defines nationality. Moreover, do the PRR comprehend the ‘cost’ of moving towards an 
ethnically pure society? Due to the usage of the PRR rhetoric and ignorance towards 
anything useful EU membership has brought along – for example the longest peaceful 
period in history of Europe – and the usage of socio-psychological strategies and 
manipulation with people’s feelings, the rise of PRR might perhaps be more profoundly 
explained through political psychology. Or perhaps power theories, since leading the 
country to right direction by back the ‘reins’ of governance is their ultimate goal.  
Populism tends to get ugly when it gets into power (Mudde, 2016b), however, populist 
progress has been accompanied almost everywhere by a profound redrawing of Europe’s 
post-war political landscape and a continuing fragmentation of national votes. The 
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precedent of EKRE’s rhetorical style in the public discourse of Estonia, has left its mark, 
as it has done in other EU countries with PRR reaching power. Although EKRE says, its 
goal is to make EU as a union of Nation States and not demolish it completely, the 
narratives of EKRE’s Eurosceptic discourse are ripe with hatred towards everything and 
everyone connected to EU with no description to how the Union of Nation States should 
operate. Therefor based on the results it is hard not to agree with Müller (2018) on his 
argument that democracy cannot be improved by anti-pluralism, since society is 
pluralistic. Even further, I argue that emotions and fear play an important role due to the 
simplicity of the texts, unimportance of factual correctness, strong use of vulgar language 
filled with judgments. Fear might be the most important tool EKRE has, at least regarding 
narratives about the EU and keeping their electorate mobilized by keeping the ‘rebellion’ 
going.  
In the future, qualitative research on the other three topics found in the research of 
Kasekampi, Madisson and Wierenga (2018) could be carried out by alternative media 
channels of the Estonian PRRs, such as Uued Uudised, Objektiiv and others. Also, the 
results of my research, EU narratives, could be tested on EKRE supporters to understand 
the level of these narratives impact on people. In addition, my research findings could be 
used as an input to help find a way to the community that lives today in the echo chamber. 
This could be done by conducting interviews with EKRE supporters to find out how much 
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Narrative tree  
THE ROOT NARRATIVES: I-V 
THE BRANCH NARRATIVES (numbers), LEAF NARRATIVES (bullet points) 
 
ROOT I  
Being against EU and EU-minded will save EU and nation states (133) 
1. EU-minded will not be able to destroy conservatists, although they try to 
(42) 
• EU and EU-minded people suppress conservative minded citizens’, like 
their freedom of speech, judge them and lie about them because 
Conservatives are real democrats (32) 
 
2. Only conservatists can help save EU and/ or Estonia (37) 
• Only conservatists know and can give people what they really want 
because are real democrats (12) 
• Conservatists have the solution for stopping terrorism caused by 
immigration in EU (8) 
• Everybody else but the ones that support conservatives is in 
subordination of Brussels (4) 
• New conservatism is truth, left liberalism is false (4) 
 
 
3. Leaving EU or/ and not following its orders is good (30) 
• Estonia should stand with and look up to its Allied nation states 
(Hungary and Poland, US) rather than EU (16) 
• Leaving leads to freedom of the nation state (10) 
• Leaving will do good for economy (8) 
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• People should stand up against immigration policy (4) 
 
4. Conservative minded have good and EU-minded bad qualities (29) 
• EU-minded prefer immigrants to nationals (7) 
• EU-minded people are brainwashed, cannot think on their own (5) 
• EU-minded are traitors of the republic (4) 
• Are afraid to be as a nation state alone without EU and other 
organizations (3) 
 
5. Being pro EU means being pro Russia, the oppressor (26) 
• left-wing people are Kremlin minded and therefor traitors (16) 
• Estonian left-minded government and political elite is Kremlin-minded 
(8) 
• West minded people accuse conservatives of being Kremlin agents, but 
are actually that themselves (7) 
 
6. EKRE does nott want to leave EU, but reduce its power over nation states 
(25) 
• Member states should have more sovereign power in decision making 
(10) 
• Immigration policy decisions should be made sovereignly (7) 
• EU should not be federalization but union of nation states (4) 
 
7. If do not support conservatists, bad things will happen (20) 
• If do not support conservatives, immigration from the South will turn 
Estonia into euro province which is followed by Russian aggression (15) 
• Estonians will go extinct (7) 
 
8. EU punishes the ones that do not follow EU’s orders (16)  




• Does not sign the Brexit deal as punishment to GB for leaving (3) 
 
9. The real and right EU people are white with conservative values (15) 
• Do not want immigrants (7) 
• With Christian values (6) 
• Indigenous people, not by passport or citizenship but by ethnicity and 
roots (3) 
• European and white (3) 
 
ROOT II 
EU wants to have (ultimate) power over its member (nation) states 
(129) 
10. EU wants to make one big EU nation (The United Nations of Europe) and 
demolish sovereign nation states (61) 
• Immigration policy is used to take away states’ sovereignty and demolish 
nation states (24) 
• Eu wants to kill traditional values, like family, culture, Christian values 
(23) 
• EU is a federation or wants to become a federation (18) 
• EU-minded prefer immigrants to nationals (8) 
• EU uses its ‘values’ like tolerance, solidarity and fake humanism to 
demolish nation states (7) 
 
 
11. EU-minded people and establishments care for money and power, not 
people (55) 
• EU legislation, values and money are instruments of political 
subordinance and power (16) 
• EU-minded governments and establishments are corrupt, deep states (12) 
• EU establishments do not understand or care what people want (8) 
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• EU establishments power states (France, Germany, Belgium aka Macron, 
Merkel, Juncker) make smaller states go along with immigration plan (4) 
• EU buys loyalty (4) 
 
12. EU has propagandistic nature (34) 
• Anything that is mainstream, like media, is under the control of Brussels 
and is used to destroy conservatists (22) 
• EU is the same as or worse than Soviet Union (15) 
• Minority groups, like young people, gays, are used as ‘whistleblowers’ 
for spreading propaganda (4) 
 
 
13. EU wants to repress not EU-minded because is afraid of losing its 
supremacy (32) 
• EU and EU-minded people want to prohibit conservatives, freedom of 
speech, judge them and lie about them, because Eu-minded are not real 
democrats (32) 
 
14. EU wants to Islamize nation states/ EU will Islamize (16) 
• Gays, women, and children are sacrificed for Islamizing Europe (10) 
• Immigration policy is for distributing Islam ideology and Islamizing EU  
(4) 
 
ROOT III  
Being and supporting EU-minded is dangerous (103) 
15. EU member states’ people are in physical danger due to EU-minded 
establishments decision-making (43) 
• Immigration policy brings violence and terrorism (36) 
• Sexual violence towards women will spread due to immigration (12) 
• Gays, women, and children are sacrificed for Islamizing Europe (8) 
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• immigration policy will not be able to stop terrorism spreading in EU (5) 
• EU may try to achieve control with aggression and violence (4) 
 
16. EU-mindedness is blind religion, ideology (Religion of Europe) (39) 
• Estonian Government worships and obeys Brussels due to which makes 
bad decisions (20) 
• EU-minded people are brainwashed, cannot think on their own and are 
afraid and have bad qualities (15) 
• EU-mindedness is forced onto young people and they are victims of it 
(4) 
 
17. If don’t support conservatists, Estonia’s sovereignty and its people’s 
freedom is at cost (26) 
 
• If do not support conservatists, immigration from the South will turn 
Estonia into euro province which is then conquered by Russians (15) 
• Eu-minded people prefer immigrants to nationals (7) 
• Estonians will go extinct (7) 
 
 
18. Due to following EU, Estonia can’t be friend with its important Visegrad 
countries Allies or US, who would help Estonia when its independency is at 
stake (19) 
• Estonia should stand with and look up to its real Allies – Hungary, 
Poland, and US – rather than EU (16) 
 
ROOT IV  
EU as an organization does not work (71) 
19. EU is no longer democratic (33) 
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• Immigration and integration policy are forced and undemocratic (17) 
• Freedom of speech is now racism, naked women in art is now sexism etc. 
(8) 
 
20. EU is not an honourable or honest organization (28) 
• EU has bad qualities – lies, is weak, has low moral etc (12) 
• Is bureaucratic (8) 
• EU or its MS break its own laws (3) 
• EU lets immigrants take over because is afraid of violence, is a coward 
(3) 
• EU immigration policy can be compared to human trafficking (3) 
 
21. EU’s politics are bad for member states or member states’ economy (24) 
• Economic politics are bad (8) 
• EU and member states should not deal with immigration at all (5) 
• EU asks too much from Estonia (4) 
• Agriculture policy is bad and unfair (3)  
 
ROOT V 
Immigration policy consequences break up EU (70) 
22. EU does not realize the bad that comes with immigration and helping 
developing countries (49) 
• Immigration policy brings violence and terrorism (31) 
• EU is not able to control immigration flow and terrorism flow into EU 
(8) 
• EU funds terrorism without knowing it (4) 
 
 
23. EU does not see that immigrants have their own agendas (27) 
• Immigrants do not want to/ will not integrate, but to take over EU (11) 
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• Immigrants are not really refugees, but come here for good economy (9) 
• Immigrants think badly of EU’s culture and values (6) 
 
24. Immigrants will not integrate, so EU’s plan to make a big EU nation will 
not work (14) 
• Immigrants do not want to/ will not integrate, but to take over EU (11) 
• Because negros and Muslims will get out of hand (3) 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
